Controverted Point: That the “person” is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.1. Anulomapaccanīka

Controverted PointNamo tassa Bhagavato Arahato Sammāsambuddhassa.

The Eight RefutationsPuggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? The First RefutationĀmantā. The Fivefold Affirmative PresentationYo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Theravādin:Is “the person” known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Yes.Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Puggalavādin:Hañci puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:Is the person knownin the same wayas a real and ultimate fact is known?“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—If the person be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also say, the person is known in the same way asany otherreal and ultimate factis known.That which you say here is wrong, namely, (1) that we ought to say, “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”, but (2) we ought not to say, the person is known in the same way asany otherreal and ultimate factis known.If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement (1) should not be admitted.In affirming the former statement (1), whiledenying the latter (2), you are wrong.‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—If the person be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also say, the person is known in the same way asany otherreal and ultimate factis known.‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

any otherNo ce pana vattabbe—is known“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—That which you say here is wrong, namely, (1) that we ought to say, “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”, but (2) we ought not to say, the person is known in the same way asany otherreal and ultimate factis known.“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. any otherYaṁ tattha vadesi—is known“vattabbe kho—If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement (1) should not be admitted.‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—In affirming the former statement (1), while‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

denying the latter (2), you are wrong.Anulomapañcakaṁ.

The Fourfold RejoinderPuggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Is the “person” not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Is it unknown in the same way as any real and ultimate fact isknown?Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Ājānāhi paṭikammaṁ. knownHañci puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:Acknowledge the rejoinder: (1) If the person be notknown in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also say: not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known. (2) That which you say here is wrong, namely, that (1) we ought to say “the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”, and (2) we ought not to say: “not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known”.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement (1) should not be admitted either.‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—In affirming (2), while denying (1), you are wrong.‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

The Fourfold RefutationNo ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin (continues):But if you imagine we ought to affirm that (1) the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, but we ought not also to affirm that (2) the “person” is not known in the same way asanyreal and ultimate factis known, then you, who have actually assented to the very proposition contained in that negative question, must certainly be refuted in the following manner: let us then refute you, for you are well refuted!“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin (continues):“puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. is knownYaṁ tattha vadesi—If (1) the “person” is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should have saidas wellthat (2) the “person” is not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known.What you affirm is false, namely, that the former statement (1) should be affirmed, but that the latter (2) should not be affirmed.“vattabbe kho—If (1) the “person” is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should have saidas wellthat (2) the “person” is not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known.‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—as well‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

What you affirm is false, namely, that the former statement (1) should be affirmed, but that the latter (2) should not be affirmed.Paṭikammacatukkaṁ.

If the latter statement (2) is not to be affirmed, then neither truly can the former (1) be affirmed.Tvañce pana maññasi—That which you say here—(1) should be affirmed, but not (2); this statement of yours is wrong.“vattabbe kho—The Fourfold Application‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin (continues):If this be a faulty refutation, look at the parallel procedure in your own argument (). Thus, according to us (1) was true (the person is known, etc.); but (2) was not true (… known in the same way, etc.). Now we, who admitted these propositions, do not consider ourselves to have been refuted.You sayyou have refuted us; anyway we are not well refuted. Your argument ran that if we affirmed (1), we must also affirm (2); that if we did not admit the truth of (2), neither could we admit the truth of (1); that we were wrong in assenting to (1), while denying (2).‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti, tena tava tattha hetāya paṭiññāya hevaṁ paṭijānantaṁ hevaṁ niggahetabbe. Puggalavādin (continues):Atha taṁ niggaṇhāma. You saySuniggahito ca hosi.

The Fourfold ConclusionHañci puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin (continues):Nay (I repeat), we are not to be refuted thus,“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin (continues):Yaṁ tattha vadesi—namely, that my proposition compels me to assent to your “known in the same way”, etc.;your pronouncement that my proposition (1) coupled with my rejection (2) is wrong;that if I reject (2), I must also reject (1);that I must affirm both or none.“vattabbe kho—namely, that my proposition compels me to assent to your “known in the same way”, etc.;‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—your pronouncement that my proposition (1) coupled with my rejection (2) is wrong;‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

that if I reject (2), I must also reject (1);No ce pana vattabbe—that I must affirm both or none.“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—This refutation of yours is badly done. I maintain, on the other hand, that my rejoinder was well done, and that my sequel to the argument was well done.“puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. The Second RefutationYaṁ tattha vadesi—The Fivefold Adverse Controversy“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti idaṁ te micchā.

Theravādin:No, it is not known …continue as in“not known”for“known”.Niggahacatukkaṁ.

continue as in“not known”for“known”.Ese ce dunniggahite hevamevaṁ tattha dakkha. The Fourfold RejoinderVattabbe kho—Theravādin:Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena”, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Yes …continue as in“known”for“not known”.“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:No ca mayaṁ tayā tattha hetāya paṭiññāya hevaṁ paṭijānantā hevaṁ niggahetabbā. continue as in“known”for“not known”.Atha maṁ niggaṇhāsi. The Fourfold RefutationDunniggahitā ca homa.

Theravādin:But if you imagine we ought to affirm that “the person” is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, but that we ought not to affirm as well that the person is known in the same way asany otherreal and ultimate factis known, etc.…continue as in“known”for“not known”.Hañci puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—any other“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. is knownYaṁ tattha vadesi—continue as in“known”for“not known”.“vattabbe kho—The Fourfold Application‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin (continues):If this be a faulty refutation, look at the parallel procedure in your own argument (). Thus, according to us (a) was true (a soul is not known, etc.); but (b) was not true (… not known in the same way, etc.). Now we, who admitted these propositions, do not consider ourselves to have been refuted, etc.‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

The Fourfold Conclusion.No ce pana vattabbe—Theravādin: (continues):Nay, I repeat, we are not to be refuted as you claim to have refuted us … wherefore your refutation was ill done, etc.“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—The Third Refutation“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Theravādin:Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:It is.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:Is the person knowneverywherein that sense?‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti idaṁ te micchā.

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Upanayanacatukkaṁ.

Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ niggahetabbe. Theravādin:Acknowledge the refutation: If the person be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you ought to admit that the person is known in that sense everywhere. You are wrong to admit the one proposition (A) and deny the other (C). If (C) is false, (A) is also false.Tena hi yaṁ niggaṇhāsi—The Fourth Refutation“hañci puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’ti. Puggalavādin:It is.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:‘vattabbe kho—Theravādin:Is the person knownalwaysin that sense?puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, no ca vattabbe—alwaysyo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said …continue as above, substituting“always”for“everywhere”.No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—continue as above, substituting“always”for“everywhere”.“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. The Fifth RefutationYaṁ tattha vadesi—Theravādin:Is the person known …as in…in everythingin the sense of a real and ultimate fact?continue as in“in everything”for“everywhere”.“vattabbe kho—as in‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—continue as in“in everything”for“everywhere”.‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti idaṁ te micchā. The Sixth RefutationTena hi ye kate niggahe se niggahe dukkaṭe. Puggalavādin:Is the personnotknown …otherwise as in… everywhere in that sense? …substituting“not known”for“known”.Sukate paṭikamme. Puggalavādin:Sukatā paṭipādanāti.

otherwise as inNiggamanacatukkaṁ.
substituting“not known”for“known”.Paṭhamo niggaho.

The Seventh Refutation2. Paccanīkānuloma

Puggalavādin:Is the personnotknown … always in that sense? …Puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. The Eighth RefutationYo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Is the person not known … in everything that sense? …Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Comparative InquiryHañci puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Comparison with other Realities, simply treated“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Theravādin:Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, and is material quality also known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Yes.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:Is material quality one thing and the person another?‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:Acknowledge the refutation: If the person and material quality be each known in the sense of real and ultimate facts, then indeed, good sir, you should also have admitted that they are distinct things. You are wrong toadmit the former proposition and not the latter. If the latter cannot be admitted, neither should the former be affirmed. To say that the person and material quality are both known in the sense of real and ultimate facts, but that they are not mutually distinct things, is false.“puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. The same form of controversy is then pursued concerning fifty-five other real and ultimate facts, or aspects of them, namely:Yaṁ tattha vadesi—The same form of controversy is then pursued concerning fifty-five other real and ultimate facts, or aspects of them, namely:“vattabbe kho—feelingperception & the other aggregatescoefficients (sankhāras)consciousnessthe organ of sightthe organ of hearingthe organ of smellthe organ of tastethe organ of touchvisible objectsoundodourtastetangible objectmind (sensus communis)cognizable objecteye as subjective elementear, nose, tongue, body as subjective elementsights, sounds, odours, tastes, touches as objective elementvisual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile cognition as subjective elementmind as subjective elementmind-cognizing as subjective elementcognizables as objective elementthe eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind as controlling powerfemale sex, male sex, life as controlling powerpleasure, pain, joy, grief, hedonic indifference as controlling powerthe controlling powers: faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understandingthe controlling powersknown as(i.) the thought, “I shall come to know the unknown”, (ii.) the coming to know, (iii.) the having known‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—feeling‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

perception & the other aggregatesPaccanīkapañcakaṁ.

coefficients (sankhāras)Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? consciousnessĀmantā. the organ of sightYo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? the organ of hearingNa hevaṁ vattabbe.

the organ of smellĀjānāhi paṭikammaṁ. the organ of tasteHañci puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—the organ of touch“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. visible objectYaṁ tattha vadesi—sound“vattabbe kho—odour‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—taste‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

tangible objectNo ce pana vattabbe—mind (sensus communis)“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—cognizable object“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. eye as subjective elementYaṁ tattha vadesi—ear, nose, tongue, body as subjective element“vattabbe kho—sights, sounds, odours, tastes, touches as objective element‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile cognition as subjective element‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

mind as subjective elementPaṭikammacatukkaṁ.

mind-cognizing as subjective elementTvañce pana maññasi—cognizables as objective element“vattabbe kho—the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind as controlling power‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—female sex, male sex, life as controlling power‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti, tena tava tattha hetāya paṭiññāya hevaṁ paṭijānantaṁ hevaṁ niggahetabbe. pleasure, pain, joy, grief, hedonic indifference as controlling powerAtha taṁ niggaṇhāma, suniggahito ca hosi.

the controlling powers: faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understandingHañci puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—the controlling powersknown as(i.) the thought, “I shall come to know the unknown”, (ii.) the coming to know, (iii.) the having known“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. known asYaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Did the Exalted One say: “There is the person who works for his own good”? And is material quality known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Is material quality one thing and the person another?“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Theravādin:Nay, that cannot be truly said.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Acknowledge this rejoinder: If the Exalted One said: “There is the person who works for his own good”, and if material quality be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also have admitted that material quality and the person are two distinct things. You are wrong in admitting the truth of the former statement while you deny that of the latter. If material quality and person are not two distinct facts, then neither can you also say that the Exalted One predicated anything concerning a “person”. Your position is false.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—The controversy is now repeated with the successive substitution of each of the real and ultimate facts named in–“material quality”.‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti idaṁ te micchā.

The controversy is now repeated with the successive substitution of each of the real and ultimate facts named in–“material quality”.Niggahacatukkaṁ.

Comparison with other Realities continued by Way of AnalogyEse ce dunniggahite hevamevaṁ tattha dakkha. Theravādin:Material quality is (you have admitted) known as a real and ultimate fact. Feeling, too, is known as such. Now, is material quality one thing and feeling another?Vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:Yes.“puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena”, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Theravādin:Is the person known also in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, as material quality is known?No ca mayaṁ tayā tattha hetāya paṭiññāya hevaṁ paṭijānantā hevaṁ niggahetabbā. Puggalavādin:Yes.Atha maṁ niggaṇhāsi, dunniggahitā ca homa.

Puggalavādin:Hañci puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:Then, is material quality one thing, person another thing?“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—Theravādin:Acknowledge the refutation: If material quality and feeling are both known as real and ultimate facts, and yet are two different things, then analogously, if the person and material quality are both known as real and ultimate facts, they, good sir, can equally be two different things. Your position in admitting the first pair of propositions, but not the second pair, is false. If you cannot admit the second pair, neither should you have admitted the first pair. Your position is false.‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—The same argument is then applied to the case of each of the other threekhandhas,substituted forfeeling.‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

The same argument is then applied to the case of each of the other threekhandhas,substituted forfeeling.No ce pana vattabbe—Thepermutations of the five aggregates (khandhas) are proceeded with as in:“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Thepermutations of the five aggregates (khandhas) are proceeded with as in:“puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Material quality and feelingthe person and material qualityYaṁ tattha vadesi—Material quality and feeling“vattabbe kho—the person and material quality‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—are replaced by:‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti idaṁ te micchā.

are replaced by:Upanayanacatukkaṁ.

feeling and perceptionThe person and feelingNa hevaṁ niggahetabbe. feeling and perceptionTena hi yaṁ niggaṇhāsi—The person and feeling“hañci puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—next by:‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’ti. next by:Yaṁ tattha vadesi—feeling and the coefficientsthe person and feeling‘vattabbe kho—feeling and the coefficientspuggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, no ca vattabbe—the person and feelingyo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

next by:No ce pana vattabbe—next by:“yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—feeling and consciousnessthe person and feeling“puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. feeling and consciousnessYaṁ tattha vadesi—the person and feeling“vattabbe kho—after whichperception,coefficients,andconsciousnessin their turn replacefeeling.‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—after whichperception,coefficients,andconsciousnessin their turn replacefeeling.‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti idaṁ te micchā. Next each of the12 Āyatanas,the18 Dhātus,and the22 Indriyasis used in turn to illustrate the analogy, thus:Tena hi ye kate niggahe se niggahe dukkaṭe. Next each of the12 Āyatanas,the18 Dhātus,and the22 Indriyasis used in turn to illustrate the analogy, thus:Sukate paṭikamme, sukatā paṭipādanāti.

organ of sight and organ of hearingthe person and organ of sightNiggamanacatukkaṁ.
organ of sight and organ of hearingDutiyo niggaho.

the person and organ of sightOkāsasaccikaṭṭha

etc. is the first grouping in the Āyatana-analogies, the last grouping in the Indriya-analogies being:1. Anulomapaccanīka

etc. is the first grouping in the Āyatana-analogies, the last grouping in the Indriya-analogies being:Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? the controlling power of “one who has come to know,” and that of “the coming to know,”the person and the controlling power of “one who has come to know.”Āmantā. the controlling power of “one who has come to know,” and that of “the coming to know,”Sabbattha puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? the person and the controlling power of “one who has come to know.”Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Material quality is knownyou have admittedin the sense of a real and ultimate fact. Is material quality one thing, feeling another thing?Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Puggalavādin:Hañci puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—you have admitted“sabbattha puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:Was it said by the Exalted One: “There is the person who works for his own good”? And is material quality known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:Well then,is material quality one thing, the person another?‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:‘sabbattha puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

Well then,No ce pana vattabbe—Theravādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.“sabbattha puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Acknowledge the rejoinder: If material quality and feeling are known as real, ultimate facts, and are different things, then why are not “the person”—a term used by the Exalted One—and material quality also two different things? Your position is false. You admit the truth of the first pair of propositions, but not that of the analogous second pair. If you deny the truth of the second pair, you should not admit the truth of the analogous first pair.“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:Yaṁ tattha vadesi—The discourse may be completed as in–“vattabbe kho—The discourse may be completed as in–‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—The “wheel” (cakka) of all the other ultimate facts—other khandhas, āyatanas, etc.—now revolves about this quotation, as it revolved in–‘sabbattha puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā …pe….

The “wheel” (cakka) of all the other ultimate facts—other khandhas, āyatanas, etc.—now revolves about this quotation, as it revolved in–Tatiyo niggaho.

Comparison by the Fourfold MethodKālasaccikaṭṭha

Theravādin:Is “the person” known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?1. Anulomapaccanīka

Puggalavādin:Yes.Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:(i.) Is material quality the person?Sabbadā puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Theravādin:Acknowledge the refutation: If the former proposition is true, you should also, good sir, have admitted the latter. If you cannot affirm that material quality is the person, neither should you have admitted that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact. Your position is false.Hañci puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:You admit the former proposition, (ii.) Now, is the personknown as beingin material quality? (iii.) Is it known as being apart from material quality? (iv.) Is material quality known as being in the person?“sabbadā puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. known as beingYaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:Acknowledge the refutation: If the person is indeed known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then, good sir, you should also have admitted one of these other three propositions. Your position is false. If you cannot admit any one of those three propositionsas to where or how the person is known, then indeed, good sir, you should not assent to the original proposition—that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.‘sabbadā puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

as to where or how the person is knownNo ce pana vattabbe—The “wheel” is then turned for all the remaining“real and ultimate facts”in relation to“person”… isfeeling the person? … is the person … in feeling? … apart from feeling? … is feeling … in the person? … is the organ of sight the person? …and so on.“sabbadā puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—The “wheel” is then turned for all the remaining“real and ultimate facts”in relation to“person”… isfeeling the person? … is the person … in feeling? … apart from feeling? … is feeling … in the person? … is the organ of sight the person? …and so on.“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:(i.) Is material quality the person?‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:‘sabbadā puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā …pe….

Theravādin:Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.Catuttho niggaho.

Puggalavādin:Acknowledge the rejoinder: If the person is not so known as you state, then you should have admitted that material quality and person are the same. If you cannot admit the latter proposition, neither can you assert the former … .Avayavasaccikaṭṭha

Puggalavādin:1. Anulomapaccanīka

Puggalavādin:Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Puggalavādin:(ii.) Is the person known as being in material quality? (iii.) Or as being apart from material quality? (iv.) Or is material quality known as being in the person?Sabbesu puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Theravādin:Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Puggalavādin:Acknowledge the rejoinder: If the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then, good sir, you should admit that it is knownin association with material qualityas advanced in the other propositions. If one of these cannot be admitted, neither should you have asserted the first proposition.Hañci puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“sabbesu puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. in association with material qualityYaṁ tattha vadesi—This and the preceding paragraph may be completed as in–“vattabbe kho—This and the preceding paragraph may be completed as in–‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—The “wheel” is then turned as indicated in–‘sabbesu puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

The “wheel” is then turned as indicated in–No ce pana vattabbe—Associated Characteristics“sabbesu puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:Is “the person” known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:Yes.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—Theravādin:Is “the person” related, or is it absolute? Is “the person” conditioned, or is it unconditioned? Is it eternal? or is it temporal? Has it external features? or is it without any?‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Nay, these things cannot truly be predicated about it …Continue as in:“Acknowledge the refutation”, etc.‘sabbesu puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Pañcamo niggaho.

Continue as in:1. Paccanīkānuloma

Puggalavādin:Is “the person” unknown in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?Puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Was it said by the Exalted One: “There is the person who works for his own good” …?Sabbattha puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Is the person related, or is it absolute? conditioned or unconditioned? eternal or temporal? with the marks or without them?Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Puggalavādin:Hañci puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:Nay, these things cannot truly be predicated about it.“sabbattha puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:Acknowledge, etc.…complete as in–Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—complete as in–‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—To clear the Meaning of the Terms‘sabbattha puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

Theravādin:Is “the person” known, and conversely, is that which is known the person?No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:The person is known. Conversely, of that which is known some is “person”, some is not “person”.“sabbattha puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Theravādin:Do you admit this with respect to the subject also: of that which is person, is some known and some not known?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.continue as before.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—continue as before.‘sabbattha puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā …pe….

Theravādin:Does “person” mean a reality and conversely?Chaṭṭho niggaho.

Puggalavādin:“Person” is a reality. Conversely, reality means in part person, in part not person.1. Paccanīkānuloma

Puggalavādin:Puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Theravādin:Do you admit this with respect to the subject also: that “person means in part reality, in part non-reality”?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Sabbadā puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Theravādin:Does the person exist, and conversely?Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Puggalavādin:The person exists. Conversely, of the existent some is person, some is not person.Hañci puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“sabbadā puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Theravādin:Of the person is some existent, some non-existent?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Query repeated with an equivalent major term.‘sabbadā puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

Theravādin:Is person something that is, and conversely?No ce pana vattabbe—Reply similar to the foregoing.“sabbadā puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Reply similar to the foregoing.“puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Theravādin:Does the person exist, and conversely, is that which existsnot allperson?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—not all“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:Yes.‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:‘sabbadā puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā …pe….

Theravādin:Can you substitute “not exist(s)” for “exist(s)”?Sattamo niggaho.

Puggalavādin:No …1. Paccanīkānuloma

Puggalavādin:Puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Inquiry into Term-or-ConceptĀmantā. Theravādin:Is one who has material quality in the sphere of matter a “person”?Sabbesu puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Theravādin:Is one who experiences desires of sense in the sphere of sense-desire “a person”?Hañci puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.“sabbesu puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Theravādin:Are those who have material qualities in the sphere of matter “persons”?“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:Yes.‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:‘sabbesu puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā.

Theravādin:Are those who experience desires of sense in the sphere of sense-desire “persons”?No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.“sabbesu puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Theravādin:Is one who is without material qualities in the sphere of the Immaterial a “person”?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Yes.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:Is one who experiences desires of sense in the sphere of sense-desire a person?‘sabbesu puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Aṭṭhakaniggaho.

Puggalavādin:Suddhikasaṁsandana

Theravādin:Are those who have no material qualities in the Immaterial sphere “persons”?Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggaloti? Theravādin:Are those who experience sense-desires in the sphere of of sense-desire “persons”?Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Puggalavādin:Hañci puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:According to you one who has material qualities in the sphere of matter is a “person”; one who has no material qualities in the Immaterial sphere is a “person”: does anyone deceasing from the Rūpa sphere get reborn in the Immaterial sphere?“aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo”ti. Puggalavādin:Yes.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—Theravādin:Is the “person” who had material qualitiesthenannihilated, and does the person with no material qualities come into being?‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.‘aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:No ce pana vattabbe—Queries repeated, substituting“being”for“person”.“aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Queries repeated, substituting“being”for“person”.“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Theravādin:Applying the terms “physical frame” and “body” indiscriminately to our body, are these identical, one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in origin?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Yes.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:Are the terms “personal entity”, or “soul”, as applied without distinction to the individual, identical, one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in origin?‘aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Yes.Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, vedanā ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe… Puggalavādin:saññā ca upalabbhati …pe… Theravādin:Is “physical frame” different from “personal entity” (or “individual”)?saṅkhārā ca upalabbhanti …pe… Puggalavādin:Yes.viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Is “soul” one thing, “body” another?Aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ añño puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Theravādin:Acknowledge the refutation: If there be this identity and coincidence between “physical frame” and “body”; and if there be this identity and coincidence between “individual” (or personal entity) and “soul”; if, further, “physical frame” is different from “individual” (or personal entity), then indeed, good sir, it should also have been admitted that “soul” is different from “body”.Hañci puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—You are wrong in“aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ añño puggalo”ti. admitting the identity between “physical frame” and “body”,admitting the identity between “personal entity” and “soul”,admitting the difference between “physical frame” and “personal entity”, whileyou deny the difference between “body” and “soul”.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—admitting the identity between “physical frame” and “body”,“vattabbe kho—admitting the identity between “personal entity” and “soul”,‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—admitting the difference between “physical frame” and “personal entity”, while‘aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā.

you deny the difference between “body” and “soul”.No ce pana vattabbe—If you cannot admit (4), neither should you have admitted (1), (2), (3). You cannot admit (1), (2), (3), while denying (4).“aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ añño puggalo”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Are the terms “physical frame” and “body” applied to body without distinction of meaning, identical, one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in origin?“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Was it said by the Exalted One: “There is the individualor personwho works for his own good”?“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—or person‘aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Is “physical frame” one thing, “individual” (or “personal entity”) another?Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, cakkhāyatanañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe… Puggalavādin:sotāyatanañca upalabbhati … ghānāyatanañca upalabbhati … jivhāyatanañca upalabbhati … kāyāyatanañca upalabbhati … rūpāyatanañca upalabbhati … saddāyatanañca upalabbhati … gandhāyatanañca upalabbhati … rasāyatanañca upalabbhati … phoṭṭhabbāyatanañca upalabbhati … manāyatanañca upalabbhati … dhammāyatanañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

Theravādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Cakkhudhātu ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe… Puggalavādin:Acknowledge my rejoinder: If there be this identity and coincidence between “physical frame” and “body” and if it was said by the Exalted One “There is the individual, etc.”… then indeed, good sir, it should also have been admitted that “physical frame” is one thing and “individual” or “personal entity” another. You are wrong in admitting the first two propositions and denying the third. If you cannot admit the third, neither should you have admitted the first two …complete the discourse as in–sotadhātu ca upalabbhati … ghānadhātu ca upalabbhati … jivhādhātu ca upalabbhati … kāyadhātu ca upalabbhati … rūpadhātu ca upalabbhati … saddadhātu ca upalabbhati … gandhadhātu ca upalabbhati … rasadhātu ca upalabbhati … phoṭṭhabbadhātu ca upalabbhati … cakkhuviññāṇadhātu ca upalabbhati … sotaviññāṇadhātu ca upalabbhati … ghānaviññāṇadhātu ca upalabbhati … jivhāviññāṇadhātu ca upalabbhati … kāyaviññāṇadhātu ca upalabbhati … manodhātu ca upalabbhati … manoviññāṇadhātu ca upalabbhati … dhammadhātu ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

Puggalavādin:Cakkhundriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe… complete the discourse as in–sotindriyañca upalabbhati … ghānindriyañca upalabbhati … jivhindriyañca upalabbhati … kāyindriyañca upalabbhati … manindriyañca upalabbhati … jīvitindriyañca upalabbhati … itthindriyañca upalabbhati … purisindriyañca upalabbhati … sukhindriyañca upalabbhati … dukkhindriyañca upalabbhati … somanassindriyañca upalabbhati … domanassindriyañca upalabbhati … upekkhindriyañca upalabbhati … saddhindriyañca upalabbhati … vīriyindriyañca upalabbhati … satindriyañca upalabbhati … samādhindriyañca upalabbhati … paññindriyañca upalabbhati … anaññātaññassāmītindriyañca upalabbhati … aññindriyañca upalabbhati … aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Examination continued by way of RebirthĀmantā. Theravādin:Does (a person or) soul run on (or transmigrate) from this world to another and from another world to this?Aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. % Dialogues, i. 46 f. points to Annihilationists.Hañci puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:Is it the identical soul who transmigrates from this world to another and from another world to this?“aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggalo”ti. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot be truly said …complete as above.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—complete as above.‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:Then is it a different soul who transmigrates …‘aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said …complete as above.No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggalo”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—complete as above.“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Theravādin:Then is it both the identical and also a different soul who transmigrates …?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:Then is it neither the identical soul, nor yet a different soul who transmigrates …?‘aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Is it the identical, a different, both identical and also different, neither identical, nor different soul who transmigrates …?Vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Then is it wrong to say, “The soul transmigrates from this world to another world, and from another world to this”?Aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Was it not said by the Exalted One:Ājānāhi paṭikammaṁ. Puggalavādin:Hañci vuttaṁ bhagavatā—“When he hath run from birth to birthSeven times and reached the last, that soulEndmaker shall become of ill,By wearing every fetter down”?“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—“When he hath run from birth to birthSeven times and reached the last, that soulEndmaker shall become of ill,By wearing every fetter down”?“aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo”ti. Is the Suttanta thus?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Then surely the soul does transmigrate from this world to another world and from another world to this. Again(repeating his first question)was it not said by the Exalted One:“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘vuttaṁ bhagavatā—(repeating his first question)atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—“Without a known beginning, Obhikkhus, is the way of life ever renewed; unrevealed is the origin of souls (lit. beings) who, shrouded in ignorance and bound by the fetters of natural desire, run on transmigrating”.‘aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā.

Is the Suttanta thus?No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Then surely the soul does transmigrate as was said.“aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Theravādin:Does the soul transmigrate from this world, etc.?‘atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:Yes.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—Theravādin:Does the identical soul so transmigrate?‘vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said …complete as usual.atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:‘aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā …pe….

complete as usual.Puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Theravādin:Is there any soul who after being human becomes adeva?“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”, vedanā ca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:Yes.saññā ca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:saṅkhārā ca upalabbhanti …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said …complete as usual.viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. complete as usual.Aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ añño puggaloti? Theravādin:I repeat, is the identical man thedeva?Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

I repeatĀjānāhi paṭikammaṁ. Puggalavādin:Yes.Hañci vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:Now you are wrong to admit as true that, having been man he becomesdeva, or having beendevahe becomes man, and again that, having become man, adevais different from a human being,and yetthat this identical soul transmigrates …“aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ añño puggalo”ti. and yetYaṁ tattha vadesi—Surely if the identical soul, withoutbecomingdifferent, transmigrates when deceasing hence to another world, there will then be no dying; destruction of life will cease to take place. There is action (karma); there is action's effect; there is the result of deeds done. But when good and bad acts are maturing as results, you say that the very samepersontransmigrates—this is wrong.“vattabbe kho—becoming‘vuttaṁ bhagavatā—personatthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:Does the self-same soul transmigrate from this world to another, from another world to this?‘aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:Yes.No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ añño puggalo”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:Is there anyone who, having been human, becomes a Yakkha, a Peta, an inmate of purgatory, a beast, for example a camel, an ox, a mule, a pig, a buffalo?“vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:Yes.‘atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Theravādin:Does the self-same human become anyone of these, say, a buffalo?“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said …complete the refutation as usual.‘vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, no ca vattabbe—complete the refutation as usual.‘aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā …pe….

Theravādin:I repeatis the self-same human the buffalo?Puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? I repeatĀmantā. Puggalavādin:Yes.Vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”, cakkhāyatanañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe… Theravādin:But all this, namely, thathaving been man, he becomes a buffalo, or having been buffalo he becomes man, again, that having become a man, he is quite different from the buffalo, and yet that the self-same soul goes on transmigrating, is wrong …complete as usual.sotāyatanañca upalabbhati …pe… But all this, namely, thatdhammāyatanañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

complete as usual.Cakkhudhātu ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe… Surely if the identical soul, when deceasing from this world and being reborn in another, is nowise different, then there will be no dying, nor will taking life be possible. There is action; there is action's effect; there is the result of deeds done. But when good and bad acts are maturing as results, you say that the identical person transmigrates—this is wrong.kāyadhātu ca upalabbhati …pe… Theravādin:You say that the identical soul transmigrates. Is there anyone who having been a noble becomes a brahmin?rūpadhātu ca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:Yes.phoṭṭhabbadhātu ca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:cakkhuviññāṇadhātu ca upalabbhati …pe… Theravādin:Is the noble in question the very same as the brahmin in question?manoviññāṇadhātu ca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said …complete the discourse.dhammadhātu ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

Puggalavādin:Cakkhundriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe… complete the discourse.sotindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe… Theravādin:Is there anyone who, having been noble, becomes reborn in the middle, or in the lower class?aññindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

Puggalavādin:Yes.Puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Is the noble in question the very same as the person so reborn?Vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. The other alternatives, substituting “brahmin”, etc., in turn for “noble”, are treated similarly.Aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggaloti? The other alternatives, substituting “brahmin”, etc., in turn for “noble”, are treated similarly.Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Theravādin:You say that the identical soul transmigrates … Is then one who has had hand or foot cut off, or hand and foot, or ear or nose, or both cut off, or finger or thumb cut off, or who is hamstrung, the same as he was before? Or is one whose fingers are bent or webbed the same as he was before? Or is one afflicted with leprosy, skin disease, dry leprosy, consumption, epilepsy, the same as he was before? Or isone who has becomea camel, ox, mule, pig, buffalo, the same as he was before?Ājānāhi paṭikammaṁ. one who has becomeHañci vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggalo”ti. Puggalavādin:Is it wrong to say: “The identical soul transmigrates from this world to another, etc.”?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:But is not one who has “attained the stream” (i.e., the first path towards salvation), when he is deceasing from the world of men, and is reborn in the world ofdevas, a stream-winner there also?‘vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:But if this man, reborn asdeva, is a stream-winner also in that world, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say: “The identical soul transmigrates from this world to another”…‘aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:No ce pana vattabbe—Theravādin:Assuming that one who has attained the stream, when deceasing from the world of men, is reborn in the world ofdevas, does the identical soul transmigrate from this world to another and from another world to this in just that manner?“aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggalo”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Yes.“vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:‘atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Theravādin:Is such a stream-winner, when reborn indeva-world, a man there also?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said …complete the “refutation”.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘vuttaṁ bhagavatā—complete the “refutation”.atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:Does the identical soul transmigrate from this world to another, etc.?‘aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Yes.Suddhikasaṁsandanā.

Puggalavādin:Opammasaṁsandana

Theravādin:Is the transmigrator not different, still present?Rūpaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, vedanā ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ rūpaṁ aññā vedanāti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Theravādin:I repeat, is the transmigrator not different, still present?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Yes.Aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Theravādin:If he has lost a hand, a foot,… if he is diseased … if he is an animal … is he the same as before?Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said …complete.Hañci rūpaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, vedanā ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ rūpaṁ aññā vedanā, puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena; Puggalavādin:tena vata re vattabbe—complete.“aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo”ti. Theravādin:Does the identical soul transmigrate? …Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Yes.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘rūpaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, vedanā ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ rūpaṁ aññā vedanā, puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:Does he transmigrate with his corporeal qualities?‘aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:Think again IDoes he transmigrate with these?“rūpaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, vedanā ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ rūpaṁ aññā vedanā, puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Think again IYaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Yes.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘rūpaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, vedanā ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ rūpaṁ aññā vedanā, puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:Are soul and body the same?‘aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said …Rūpaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, saññā ca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:saṅkhārā ca upalabbhanti …pe… Theravādin:Does he transmigrate with feeling, with perception, with mental coefficients, with consciousness?viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ rūpaṁ aññaṁ viññāṇanti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Theravādin:Think again … does he transmigrate with consciousness?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Yes.Aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Theravādin:Is soul the same as body?Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Hañci rūpaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ rūpaṁ aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ, puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena; Puggalavādin:tena vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:If, as you say, the identical soul transmigrates,… does he transmigrate without corporeal qualities, without feeling, perception, mental coefficients, without consciousness?“aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo”ti. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—Theravādin:Think again … without corporeal qualities … without consciousness?‘rūpaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ rūpaṁ aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ, puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Yes.‘aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:No ce pana vattabbe—Theravādin:Is then the soul one thing, the body another?“aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.“rūpaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ rūpaṁ aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ, puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Theravādin:If, as you say, the identical soul transmigrates,… do the material qualities transmigrate?“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be admitted.‘rūpaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ rūpaṁ aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ, puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:‘aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Yes.Vedanā upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, saññā ca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:saṅkhārā ca upalabbhanti …pe… Theravādin:But is this soul (x) the same as this body (x)?viññāṇañca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

Puggalavādin:Saññā upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, saṅkhārā ca upalabbhanti …pe… Theravādin:Does feeling … or perception … or do mental coefficients … or does consciousness transmigrate?viññāṇañca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.rūpañca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:vedanā ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

Theravādin:Think again … does consciousness transmigrate?Saṅkhārā upalabbhanti saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, viññāṇañca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:Yes.rūpañca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:vedanā ca upalabbhati …pe… Theravādin:But is this soul (x) the same as this body (x)?saññā ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Viññāṇaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:vedanā ca upalabbhati …pe… Theravādin:Then, the identical soul, according to you, transmigrating … does none of the above-named five aggregates transmigrate?saññā ca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.saṅkhārā ca upalabbhanti saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ aññe saṅkhārāti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Yes, they do.Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Is, then, soul one thing, body another?Aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ añño puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. At dissolution of each aggregate.If then the “person” doth disintegrate,Lo! by the Buddha shunned, the Nihilistic creed.At dissolution of each aggregate.If then the “soul” doth not disintegrate.Eternal, likeNibbāna, were the soul indeed.Hañci viññāṇaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, saṅkhārā ca upalabbhanti saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ aññe saṅkhārā, puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena; At dissolution of each aggregate.If then the “person” doth disintegrate,Lo! by the Buddha shunned, the Nihilistic creed.At dissolution of each aggregate.If then the “soul” doth not disintegrate.Eternal, likeNibbāna, were the soul indeed.tena vata re vattabbe—Derivatives“aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ añño puggalo”ti. Examination Continued by Way of Derivative ConceptsYaṁ tattha vadesi—Theravādin:Is the concept of soul derived from the corporeal qualities?“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:Yes.‘viññāṇaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, saṅkhārā ca upalabbhanti saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ aññe saṅkhārā, puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:‘aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā.

Theravādin:Are material qualities impermanent, conditioned, do they happen through a cause? Are they liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Yes.“aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ añño puggalo”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“viññāṇaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, saṅkhārā ca upalabbhanti saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ aññe saṅkhārā, puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Theravādin:But has soul also any or all of these qualities?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘viññāṇaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, saṅkhārā ca upalabbhanti saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ aññe saṅkhārā, puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:Or is the concept of soul derived from feeling, from perception, from mental coefficients, from consciousness?‘aññaṁ viññāṇaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Yes (to each “aggregate” in succession).Cakkhāyatanaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, sotāyatanañca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:dhammāyatanañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe… to each “aggregate” in successionsotāyatanaṁ upalabbhati …pe… Theravādin:Is any mental aggregate impermanent, conditioned? does it happen through a cause? is it liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?dhammāyatanaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, cakkhāyatanañca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:Yes.manāyatanañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

Puggalavādin:Cakkhudhātu upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, sotadhātu ca upalabbhati …pe… Theravādin:But has soul also any or all of these qualities?dhammadhātu ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.sotadhātu upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:dhammadhātu upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, cakkhudhātu ca upalabbhati …pe… Theravādin:You said that the concept of soul is derived from material qualities. Is the concept of blue-green soul derived from blue-green material qualities?manoviññāṇadhātu ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Cakkhundriyaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, sotindriyañca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe… Theravādin:Or is the concept of yellow, red, white, visible, invisible, resisting, or unresisting soul derived from corresponding material qualities, respectively?sotindriyaṁ upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .aññātāvindriyaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe… Puggalavādin:cakkhundriyañca upalabbhati …pe… Theravādin:Is the concept of soul derived from feeling?aññindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ aññaṁ aññindriyanti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Theravādin:Is the concept of good soul derived from good feeling?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Yes.Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Puggalavādin:Hañci aññātāvindriyaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ aññaṁ aññindriyaṁ, puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena; Theravādin:Now, does feeling entail result or fruit, fruit that is desirable, pleasing, gladdening, unspotted, a happy result, and such as conveys happiness?tena vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:No.“aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggalo”ti. Puggalavādin:Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Yes.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘aññātāvindriyaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ aññaṁ aññindriyaṁ, puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:But does “good soul” entail result or fruit of like nature with the above?‘aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggalo”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:If the concept of soul is derived from feeling, is the concept of bad soul derived from bad feeling?“aññātāvindriyaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ aññaṁ aññindriyaṁ, puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:Yes.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—Theravādin:Now does bad feeling entail result or fruit, fruit that is undesirable, unpleasing, spotted, an unhappy result, and such as conveys unhappiness?‘aññātāvindriyaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ aññaṁ aññindriyaṁ, puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Yes.‘aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Rūpaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, vedanā ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ rūpaṁ aññā vedanāti? Theravādin:But does bad soul entail result or fruit of like nature to the above?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Theravādin:If the concept of soul is derived from feeling, is the concept of indeterminate soul—one to be termed neither good nor bad—derived from indeterminate feeling?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said.Aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Theravādin:Is the conceptI repeatof an ethically indeterminate soul derived from an ethically indeterminate feeling?Ājānāhi paṭikammaṁ. I repeatHañci rūpaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, vedanā ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ rūpaṁ aññā vedanā, vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:Yes.“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena; Puggalavādin:tena vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:Is indeterminate feeling impermanent, conditioned? Does it happen through a cause? Is it liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?“aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo”ti. Puggalavādin:Yes.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—Theravādin:Has an ethically indeterminate soul any or all of these qualities?‘rūpaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, vedanā ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ rūpaṁ aññā vedanā, vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:‘aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā.

Theravādin:Is the concept of soul derived from any of the other three aggregates: perception, mental coefficients, consciousness?No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Yes.“aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“rūpaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, vedanā ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ rūpaṁ aññā vedanā, vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Theravādin:Taking the last: is the concept of good soul derived from good consciousness?‘atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Taking the lastYaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘rūpaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, vedanā ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ rūpaṁ aññā vedanā, vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Theravādin:Now does good consciousness entail result or fruit—fruit that is desirable, pleasing, gladdening, unspotted, a happy result, such as conveys happiness?atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno, rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Yes.‘aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Rūpaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, saññā ca upalabbhati … Theravādin:And does a good soul also entail the like?saṅkhārā ca upalabbhanti … Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .viññāṇañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

Puggalavādin:Vedanā upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, saññā ca upalabbhati … Theravādin:You say that the concept of soul is derived from consciousness—is the concept of bad soul derived from bad consciousness?saṅkhārā ca upalabbhanti … Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .viññāṇañca upalabbhati … Puggalavādin:rūpañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

Theravādin:I repeatis the concept of bad soul derived from bad consciousness?Saññā upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, saṅkhārā ca upalabbhanti … I repeatviññāṇañca upalabbhati … Puggalavādin:Yes.rūpañca upalabbhati … Puggalavādin:vedanā ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

Theravādin:Now does bad consciousness entail result or fruit, fruit that is undesirable, etc. (the reverse of what is entailed by good consciousness)?Saṅkhārā upalabbhanti saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, viññāṇañca upalabbhati … Puggalavādin:Yes.rūpañca upalabbhati … Puggalavādin:vedanā ca upalabbhati … Theravādin:And does a bad soul also entail the like?saññā ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Viññāṇaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhati … Puggalavādin:vedanā ca upalabbhati … Theravādin:Again, since you admit that the concept of soul is derived from any or all of the aggregates,e.g., consciousness, is the concept of an ethically indeterminate soul derived from indeterminate consciousness?saññā ca upalabbhati … Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .saṅkhārā ca upalabbhanti saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

Puggalavādin:Cakkhāyatanaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, sotāyatanañca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:Yes.dhammāyatanañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe… Puggalavādin:sotāyatanaṁ upalabbhati …pe… Theravādin:But is the ethically indeterminate soul impermanent, conditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish … to change?dhammāyatanaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, cakkhāyatanañca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .manāyatanañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

Puggalavādin:Cakkhudhātu upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, sotadhātu ca upalabbhati …pe… Theravādin:Ought it to be said that a soul who sees is derived from sight (or eye)?dhammadhātu ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe… Puggalavādin:Yes.sotadhātu upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe… Puggalavādin:dhammadhātu upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, cakkhudhātu ca upalabbhati …pe… Theravādin:Ought it to be said that, when sight (or eye) ceases, the seeing soul ceases?manoviññāṇadhātu ca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe….

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Cakkhundriyaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, sotindriyañca upalabbhati …pe… Puggalavādin:aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena …pe… The pair of queries is applied, with like replies, to the other four senses, and also to thesensus communis,mano.sotindriyaṁ upalabbhati …pe… The pair of queries is applied, with like replies, to the other four senses, and also to thesensus communis,mano.aññātāvindriyaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, cakkhundriyañca upalabbhati …pe… Theravādin:Ought it to be said that a soul of wrong views is derived from wrong views?aññindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena; Puggalavādin:Yes.aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ aññaṁ aññindriyanti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Ought it to be said that when the wrong views cease to exist, the soul having wrong views ceases to exist?Vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said …“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Ought it, again, to be said that when any other parts of the Wrong Eightfold Path cease to exist, the soul, said by you to be derived from that part, ceases to exist?Aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Ājānāhi paṭikammaṁ. Theravādin:Similarly, ought it to be said that a soul of right views, or right aspiration, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right endeavour, right mindfulness, right concentration, is derived from the corresponding partof the Eightfold Path?Hañci aññātāvindriyaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ aññaṁ aññindriyaṁ, vuttaṁ bhagavatā—of the Eightfold Path“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena; Puggalavādin:Yes.tena vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggalo”ti. Theravādin:Ought it, again, to be said that when the given part ceases, the soul so derived ceases?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘aññātāvindriyaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ aññaṁ aññindriyaṁ, vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Theravādin:Is the concept of soul derived from material qualities and feeling?atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Yes.‘aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:No ce pana vattabbe—Theravādin:Then could the concept of a double soul be derived from the pair of aggregates?“aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggalo”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .“aññātāvindriyaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ aññaṁ aññindriyaṁ, vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:‘atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Theravādin:Or could the concept of a double soul be derived from material quality coupled with any of the other three aggregates … or the concept of five souls be derived from all five aggregates?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘aññātāvindriyaṁ upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ aññaṁ aññindriyaṁ, vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Theravādin:Is the concept of soul derived from the organs of sight (eye) and hearing (ear)?atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno, aññātāvindriyañca upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Yes.‘aññaṁ aññātāvindriyaṁ añño puggalo’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Opammasaṁsandanaṁ.

Theravādin:Then could the concept “two souls” be derived from the two organs? …and so on as ināyatanas—i.e., organs and objects of sense and the organ and object of sense co-ordination,mano,dhammā.Catukkanayasaṁsandana

and so on as ināyatanas—i.e., organs and objects of sense and the organ and object of sense co-ordination,mano,dhammā.Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Theravādin:Is the concept of soul derived from the elements of sight (or eye) and hearing (or ear)?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Yes.Rūpaṁ puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Theravādin:Could the concept of a double soul be derived from these two?Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Hañci puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“rūpaṁ puggalo”ti. Theravādin:Is the concept of soul derived from the element of sight and any other of the eighteen elements?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Yes.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:Could the concept of eighteen souls be derived from the eighteen elements?‘rūpaṁ puggalo’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot be truly said … .No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“rūpaṁ puggalo”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:Is the concept of soul derived from the controlling powers—eye and ear?“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:Yes.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—Theravādin:Could the concept of a double soul be derived from these two?‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .‘rūpaṁ puggalo’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Theravādin:Could the concept of soul be derived from the controlling power, eye, and from any other of the twenty-two controlling powers?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Yes.Rūpasmiṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:aññatra rūpā puggalo …pe… Theravādin:Could the concept of twenty-two souls be derived from these?puggalasmiṁ rūpanti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Theravādin:Is the concept of one soul derived from the becoming of one aggregate?Hañci puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Yes.“puggalasmiṁ rūpan”ti. Puggalavādin:Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Theravādin:Could the concept of four souls be derived from the becoming of the four (mental) aggregates?“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:‘puggalasmiṁ rūpan’”ti micchā.

Theravādin:Or again, by your assenting to the former question, could the concept of five souls be derived from the becoming of the five aggregates (mental and bodily)?No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .“puggalasmiṁ rūpan”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Theravādin:Is there only one soul in the becoming of one aggregate?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Yes.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:Then are five souls in the becoming of all five aggregates?‘puggalasmiṁ rūpan’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Is the concept of soul derived from material qualities just as the idea of shadow is derived from a tree? And just as the idea of its shadow is derived from the tree, and both tree and shadow are impermanent, is it even so that the concept of soul is derived from material qualities, both soul and material qualities being impermanent?Vedanā puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .vedanāya puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:aññatra vedanāya puggalo …pe… Theravādin:Are material qualities one thing and the concept of soul derived therefrom another, in the same way as the tree is one thing, and the idea of shadow derived from it another?puggalasmiṁ vedanā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Saññā puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:saññāya puggalo …pe… Theravādin:Is the concept of soul derived from material qualities just as the notion “villager” is derived from village? And if that is so, is material quality one thing, soul another, just as village is one thing, villager another?aññatra saññāya puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .puggalasmiṁ saññā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Saṅkhārā puggalo …pe… Theravādin:Or—just as a kingdom is one thing, a king another?saṅkhāresu puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .aññatra saṅkhārehi puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:puggalasmiṁ saṅkhārā …pe….

Theravādin:A jail is not a jailer, but a jailer is he who has the jail. Is it just so with material qualities and one who has them? And accordingly, just as the jail is one thing, the jailer another, are not material qualities one thing, and one who has them another?Viññāṇaṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .viññāṇasmiṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:aññatra viññāṇā puggalo …pe… Consciousnesspuggalasmiṁ viññāṇanti? Theravādin:Is there the notion of soul to eachmoment ofconsciousness?Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

moment ofĀjānāhi niggahaṁ. Puggalavādin:Yes.Hañci puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“puggalasmiṁ viññāṇan”ti. Theravādin:Does the soul undergo birth, decay, death, disease and rebirth in eachmoment ofconsciousness?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—moment of“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:‘puggalasmiṁ viññāṇan’”ti micchā.

Theravādin:When the secondmoment ofconsciousness in a process of thought arises, is it wrong to say: “It is the same, or something different”?No ce pana vattabbe—moment of“puggalasmiṁ viññāṇan”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Yes.“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Theravādin:Then, when the second moment arises, is it not also wrong to say: “It is a boy” or “it is a girl”?“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:It may be so said.‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:‘puggalasmiṁ viññāṇan’”ti micchā …pe….

Theravādin:Now acknowledge the refutation: If at the second moment of consciousness it could not be said, “It is the same or something different”, then indeed, good sir, neither can it be said, at that moment, that “It is a boy, or a girl”. What you say, namely, that the former may not, the latter may be affirmed, is false. If the former proposition may not be affirmed, the second cannot be affirmed. Your rejecting the one and accepting the other is wrong.Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? According to you it is wrong to say, when the second moment of consciousness arises, “It is the same or something different”. Can it not then, at such a moment, be said: “It is male or female, layman or religious, man ordeva”.Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Yes, it can be …complete as inCakkhāyatanaṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:cakkhāyatanasmiṁ puggalo …pe… complete as inaññatra cakkhāyatanā puggalo …pe… The Five Sensespuggalasmiṁ cakkhāyatanaṁ …pe… Puggalavādin:Is it wrong to say: “The soul or person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?dhammāyatanaṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:dhammāyatanasmiṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:Is it not the case that when someone sees something by means of something, a certain “he” sees a certain “it” by a certain “means”?aññatra dhammāyatanā puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:puggalasmiṁ dhammāyatanaṁ …pe….

Puggalavādin:But if that is so, then surely it should be said that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?Cakkhudhātu puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:cakkhudhātuyā puggalo …pe… Analogous questions are asked concerning the other four senses. Again:.aññatra cakkhudhātuyā puggalo …pe… Analogous questions are asked concerning the other four senses. Again:.puggalasmiṁ cakkhudhātu …pe… Puggalavādin:Is it not the case that when someone knows something by means of something, a certain “he” knows a certain “it” by a certain “means”? If so, then surely it may be said that the person is known in a real and ultimate sense.dhammadhātu puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:dhammadhātuyā puggalo …pe… Theravādin:Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?aññatra dhammadhātuyā puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:Yes.puggalasmiṁ dhammadhātu …pe….

Puggalavādin:Cakkhundriyaṁ puggalo …pe… Theravādin:Is it not the case that when someone does not see something by means of something, a certain “he” does not see a certain “it” by a certain “means”?cakkhundriyasmiṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:Yes.aññatra cakkhundriyā puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:puggalasmiṁ cakkhundriyaṁ …pe… Theravādin:Then it is equally the case that the person is not known in a real and ultimate sense.aññātāvindriyaṁ puggalo …pe… Analogous questions are asked concerning the other four senses and cognition generally.aññātāvindriyasmiṁ puggalo …pe… Analogous questions are asked concerning the other four senses and cognition generally.aññatra aññātāvindriyā puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:Is it wrong to say the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?puggalasmiṁ aññātāvindriyanti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Was it not said by the Exalted One:Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Puggalavādin:Hañci puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata re vattabbe—“Obhikkhus, I see beings deceasing and being reborn by the purified vision of the eye celestial, surpassing that of men. I discern beings in spheres sublime or base, fair or frightful, of happy or woefuldoom, faring according to their actions”?“puggalasmiṁ aññātāvindriyan”ti. Is the Suttanta thus?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Surely then the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:Granting that the Exalted One said that which is quoted, is that a reason for affirming that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?‘puggalasmiṁ aññātāvindriyan’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:Yes.No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“puggalasmiṁ aññātāvindriyan”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:Does the Exalted One, by the purified vision of the eye celestial surpassing that of man, see visible objects, and does he also see the person or soul?“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti. Puggalavādin:He sees visible objects.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—Theravādin:Are visible objects the person? Do they end one life and reappear? Do they fare according toKarma?‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .‘puggalasmiṁ aññātāvindriyan’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:He does see the person or soul.Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Theravādin:Is then the soul visible object? Is it object of sight, objective element of sight, blue, green, yellow, red, white? Is it cognizable by sight? Does it impinge on the eye? Does it enter the avenue of sight?“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”ti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Rūpaṁ puggaloti? Puggalavādin:He does see both.Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Ājānāhi paṭikammaṁ. Theravādin:Are both then visible objects? Both objective element of sight? Are both blue, green, yellow, red, white? Are both cognizable by sight? Do both impingeon the eye? Do both enter the avenue of sight? Do both disappear, reappear in rebirths, faring according toKarma?Hañci vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”, tena vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“rūpaṁ puggalo”ti. Ethical GoodnessYaṁ tattha vadesi—Examination continued by Reference to Human Action, called also “The Section on Ethical Goodness”“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:Are ethically good and bad actions knownto exist?‘vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’, no ca vattabbe—to exist‘rūpaṁ puggaloti’” micchā.

Puggalavādin:Are both the doer of ethically good and bad deeds, and he who causes them to be done knownto exist?No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“rūpaṁ puggalo”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—to exist“vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Theravādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said …complete in the usual way, viz., that the former admission involves acceptance of what is denied.‘atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’”ti. complete in the usual way, viz., that the former admission involves acceptance of what is denied.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Theravādin:Admitting that ethically good and bad deeds are knownto exist, do you assert that the doer and the instigator are also knownto exist?“vattabbe kho—to exist‘vuttaṁ bhagavatā—to existatthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Yes.‘rūpaṁ puggalo’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Theravādin:Then is he who made the doer, or inspired the instigator, knownto exist?Āmantā. to existVuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”ti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Yes.Rūpasmiṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:aññatra rūpā puggalo …pe… Theravādin:But if the one be thus maker, etc., of the other, is there then no making an end of ill, no cutting off the cycle of life renewed, no finalNibbānawithout residual stuff of life?puggalasmiṁ rūpaṁ …pe….

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Vedanā puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:vedanāya puggalo …pe… Theravādin:If good and bad deeds are knownto take place, is the doer, is the instigator, of those deeds known to exist?aññatra vedanāya puggalo …pe… to take placepuggalasmiṁ vedanā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Yes.Saññā puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:saññāya puggalo …pe… Theravādin:Is the person or soul known to exist, and his maker or inspirer also?aññatra saññāya puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .puggalasmiṁ saññā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Saṅkhārā puggalo …pe… Theravādin:I repeat my question: if good and bad deeds … .saṅkhāresu puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:Yes.aññatra saṅkhārehi puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:puggalasmiṁ saṅkhārā …pe….

Theravādin:Then isNibbānaalsoknown to exist, and the maker and the maker's maker as well?Viññāṇaṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .viññāṇasmiṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:aññatra viññāṇā puggalo …pe… Theravādin:Then, again, if these things be as you say, is the earth known to exist, and its maker andhismaker also?puggalasmiṁ viññāṇanti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Ājānāhi paṭikammaṁ. Theravādin:Or the ocean?—or Sineru, chief of mountains?—or water?—or fire?—or air?—or grass, brush, and forest? and the maker of each and his maker also?Hañci vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”, tena vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“puggalasmiṁ viññāṇan”ti. Theravādin:Again, if good and bad deeds being known to exist, doer and instigator are also known to exist, are those deeds one thing, and doer and instigator quite another thing?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:Is the effect of ethically good and bad deeds known to take place?atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:‘puggalasmiṁ viññāṇan’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:Is one who experiences the effect of such deeds known to exist?No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“puggalasmiṁ viññāṇan”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .“vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Theravādin:Admitting that both these propositions are true, is one who enjoys the first-named person known to exist?‘atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’”ti. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:Yes.‘vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:If the one and the other be so, is there no making an end of ill, no cutting off the cycle of life renewed, no finalNibbānawithout residual stuff of life?‘puggalasmiṁ viññāṇan’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Again, admitting both those propositions to be true, does the person exist, and the enjoyer of that person also exist?Vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”ti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Again, admitting both those propositions to be true, isNibbānaknown to exist, and one who experiences it also?Cakkhāyatanaṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .cakkhāyatanasmiṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:aññatra cakkhāyatanā puggalo …pe… Theravādin:Or again, is the earth, the ocean, Sineru chief of mountains, water, fire, air, grass, brush, and forest, known to exist, and one who experiences any of them known also to exist?puggalasmiṁ cakkhāyatanaṁ …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .dhammāyatanaṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:dhammāyatanasmiṁ puggalo …pe… Theravādin:Orfinallyis the result of ethically good and bad deeds one thing and he who experiences those results another?aññatra dhammāyatanā puggalo …pe… finallypuggalasmiṁ dhammāyatanaṁ …pe….

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Cakkhudhātu puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:cakkhudhātuyā puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:Is celestial happiness known to exist?aññatra cakkhudhātuyā puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:puggalasmiṁ cakkhudhātu …pe… Puggalavādin:Is one who is experiencing celestial happiness known to exist?dhammadhātu puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:dhammadhātuyā puggalo …pe… Theravādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .aññatra dhammadhātuyā puggalo …pe… Theravādin:Assuming both propositions to be true, is one who enjoys that experiencer known to exist?puggalasmiṁ dhammadhātu …pe….

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Cakkhundriyaṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:cakkhundriyasmiṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:Yes.aññatra cakkhundriyā puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:puggalasmiṁ cakkhundriyaṁ …pe… Theravādin:If the one and the other be so, is there no making an end of ill, no cutting off the cycle of life, no finalNibbānawithout residual stuff of life?aññātāvindriyaṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .aññātāvindriyasmiṁ puggalo …pe… Puggalavādin:aññatra aññātāvindriyā puggalo …pe… Theravādin:Again, assuming both those propositions to be true, is the person known to exist and the enjoyer of the person also?puggalasmiṁ aññātāvindriyanti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Ājānāhi paṭikammaṁ. Theravādin:Again, assuming that celestial happiness and those enjoying it are both known to exist, isNibbānaknown, and one enjoying it known also to exist?Hañci vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”, tena vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“puggalasmiṁ aññātāvindriyan”ti. Theravādin:Or again, assuming as before, are the earth, the ocean, Sineru chief of mountains, water, fire, air, grass, brush, and forest known to exist and those enjoying them?Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Theravādin:Or again, assuming as before, is celestial happiness one thing, the enjoyer another thing?atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .‘puggalasmiṁ aññātāvindriyan’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Is human happiness known to exist?“puggalasmiṁ aññātāvindriyan”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:Is the enjoyer of human happiness known to exist?‘atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’”ti. Puggalavādin:Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Theravādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .“vattabbe kho—Theravādin:Is both human happiness and the enjoyer of it known to exist?‘vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:Yes.atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:‘puggalasmiṁ aññātāvindriyan’”ti micchā …pe….

Theravādin:Is one who enjoys the enjoyer known to exist?Catukkanayasaṁsandanaṁ.

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Lakkhaṇayutti

Puggalavādin:Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Puggalo sappaccayo …pe… Theravādin:If the one and the other be so, is there no making an end of ill, no cutting off the cycle of life, no finalNibbānawithout residual stuff of life?puggalo appaccayo … Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .puggalo saṅkhato … Puggalavādin:puggalo asaṅkhato … The dialogue is then completed, as inpuggalo sassato … The dialogue is then completed, as inpuggalo asassato … Puggalavādin:Is the misery of the lower planes known to exist?puggalo sanimitto … Puggalavādin:puggalo animittoti? Puggalavādin:Is the experiencer of that misery known to exist?Na hevaṁ vattabbe. Puggalavādin:(Saṅkhittaṁ.)

Theravādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Theravādin:Do you admit both these propositions?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Yes.Vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”ti? Theravādin:Is the enjoyer of the sufferer of that misery known to exist?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Puggalo sappaccayo …pe… Puggalavādin:puggalo appaccayo … Puggalavādin:Yes.puggalo saṅkhato … Puggalavādin:puggalo asaṅkhato … Theravādin:If the one and the other be so, is there no making an end of ill, etc.?complete in full as inpuggalo sassato … complete in full as inpuggalo asassato … Puggalavādin:Is the misery of purgatory known?Complete as inpuggalo sanimitto … Puggalavādin:puggalo animittoti? Complete as inNa hevaṁ vattabbe. Theravādin:Are ethically good and bad acts (karmas) known to exist? And the doer of them also? And the instigator also? And the enjoyer of the effect—is he also known to exist?(Saṅkhittaṁ.)

Puggalavādin:Yes.Lakkhaṇayuttikathā.

Puggalavādin:Vacanasodhana

Theravādin:Is he who does the acts the same as he who experiences the effect?Puggalo upalabbhati, upalabbhati puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Puggalo upalabbhati, upalabbhati kehici puggalo kehici na puggaloti. Puggalavādin:Puggalo kehici upalabbhati kehici na upalabbhatīti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Puggalo saccikaṭṭho, saccikaṭṭho puggaloti? Theravādin:Then, are happiness and misery self-caused?Puggalo saccikaṭṭho, saccikaṭṭho kehici puggalo kehici na puggaloti. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Puggalo kehici saccikaṭṭho kehici na saccikaṭṭhoti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Theravādin:Then, admitting you still assent to my first propositions, is the doer a differentpersonfrom the enjoyerof the effect?Puggalo vijjamāno, vijjamāno puggaloti? personPuggalo vijjamāno, vijjamāno kehici puggalo kehici na puggaloti. of the effectPuggalo kehici vijjamāno kehici na vijjamānoti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Puggalo saṁvijjamāno, saṁvijjamāno puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Puggalo saṁvijjamāno, saṁvijjamāno kehici puggalo kehici na puggaloti. Puggalavādin:Puggalo kehici saṁvijjamāno kehici na saṁvijjamānoti? Theravādin:Then, are happiness and misery caused by another?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Puggalo atthi, atthi puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Puggalo atthi, atthi kehici puggalo kehici na puggaloti. Theravādin:Admitting you still assent to the first propositions, does the same and another do the deeds, does the same and another enjoy (the results)?Puggalo kehici atthi kehici natthīti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Puggalo atthi, atthi na sabbo puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Āmantā …pe… Puggalavādin:puggalo natthi, natthi na sabbo puggaloti? Theravādin:Then is happiness and is misery both self-caused and produced by another?Na hevaṁ vattabbe. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .(Saṅkhittaṁ.)

Puggalavādin:Vacanasodhanaṁ.

Theravādin:Admitting that you still assent to the first propositions, does neither the samepersonboth do the deeds and experience the results, nor onepersondo the deeds and another experience the results?Paññattānuyoga

personRūpadhātuyā rūpī puggaloti? personĀmantā. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Kāmadhātuyā kāmī puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Yes, neither the same, nor two different persons.Rūpadhātuyā rūpino sattāti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Then are happiness and misery not self-causing nor caused by something else?Kāmadhātuyā kāmino sattāti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Arūpadhātuyā arūpī puggaloti? Theravādin:Admitting, finally, that you still assent to the first propositions, namely, that ethically good and bad actions; as well as the doer of them, and the instigator of the doer, are known to exist,I have now asked you four further questions:Āmantā. I have now asked you four further questions:Kāmadhātuyā kāmī puggaloti? Is he who does the act the same as he who experiences the effect?Are doer and experiencer two different persons?Are they the same and also different persons?Are they neither the same nor different persons?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Is he who does the act the same as he who experiences the effect?Arūpadhātuyā arūpino sattāti? Are doer and experiencer two different persons?Āmantā. Are they the same and also different persons?Kāmadhātuyā kāmino sattāti? Are they neither the same nor different persons?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

You have answered to each:No.I have then repeatedthe question. You have then said: Yes. I have then put four questions:Rūpadhātuyā rūpī puggalo arūpadhātuyā arūpī puggalo, atthi ca koci rūpadhātuyā cuto arūpadhātuṁ upapajjatīti? You have answered to each:Āmantā. I have then repeatedthe question. You have then saidRūpī puggalo upacchinno, arūpī puggalo jātoti? Are happiness and misery self-caused?Are they the work of another?Are they both one and the other?Are they, arising through a cause, self-caused, or the work of another?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Are happiness and misery self-caused?Rūpadhātuyā rūpino sattā arūpadhātuyā arūpino sattā, atthi ca koci rūpadhātuyā cuto arūpadhātuṁ upapajjatīti? Are they the work of another?Āmantā. Are they both one and the other?Rūpī satto upacchinno, arūpī satto jātoti? Are they, arising through a cause, self-caused, or the work of another?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

And you have replied: No … .Kāyoti vā sarīranti vā, sarīranti vā kāyoti vā, kāyaṁ appiyaṁ karitvā esese ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāteti? And you have repliedĀmantā. Puggalavādin:Is there such a thing askarma(action taking effect)?Puggaloti vā jīvoti vā, jīvoti vā puggaloti vā, puggalaṁ appiyaṁ karitvā esese ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāteti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Is there such a thing as a maker ofkarma?Añño kāyo, añño puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Aññaṁ jīvaṁ, aññaṁ sarīranti? Theravādin:Is there such a thing as bothkarmaand the maker ofkarma?Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Yes.Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Puggalavādin:Hañci kāyoti vā sarīranti vā, sarīranti vā kāyoti vā, kāyaṁ appiyaṁ karitvā esese ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāte, puggaloti vā jīvoti vā, jīvoti vā puggaloti vā, puggalaṁ appiyaṁ karitvā esese ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāte, añño kāyo añño puggalo; Theravādin:Is there a maker of that maker?tena vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .“aññaṁ jīvaṁ aññaṁ sarīran”ti. Puggalavādin:Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:Yes.“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:‘kāyoti vā sarīranti vā, sarīranti vā kāyoti vā, kāyaṁ appiyaṁ karitvā esese ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāte, puggaloti vā jīvoti vā, jīvoti vā puggaloti vā, puggalaṁ appiyaṁ karitvā esese ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāte, añño kāyo añño puggalo’, no ca vattabbe—Theravādin:Then if the one and the other exist, is there no making an end of ill, no cutting of the cycle of life, no finalNibbānawithout residual stuff of life?‘aññaṁ jīvaṁ aññaṁ sarīran’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .No ce pana vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“aññaṁ jīvaṁ aññaṁ sarīran”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—Theravādin:Again, since you assent to both the first propositions, is there both a person and a maker of the person?“kāyoti vā sarīranti vā, sarīranti vā kāyoti vā, kāyaṁ appiyaṁ karitvā esese ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāte, puggaloti vā jīvoti vā, jīvoti vā puggaloti vā, puggalaṁ appiyaṁ karitvā esese ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāte, añño kāyo añño puggalo”ti. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—Theravādin:Or … is there bothNibbānaand a maker thereof? … or the earth, ocean, Sineru, water, fire, air, grass, brush and forest, and the maker thereof?‘kāyoti vā sarīranti vā, sarīranti vā kāyoti vā, kāyaṁ appiyaṁ karitvā esese ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāte, puggaloti vā jīvoti vā, jīvoti vā puggaloti vā, puggalaṁ appiyaṁ karitvā esese ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāte, añño kāyo añño puggalo’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .‘aññaṁ jīvaṁ aññaṁ sarīran’”ti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Kāyoti vā sarīranti vā, sarīranti vā kāyoti vā, kāyaṁ appiyaṁ karitvā esese ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāteti? Theravādin:… Or iskarmaone thing, the maker of it another?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”ti? Puggalavādin:Is there such a thing as result of action?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Añño kāyo añño puggaloti? Puggalavādin:Is there such a thing as an enjoyer of the result?Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Ājānāhi paṭikammaṁ. Theravādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said …Hañci kāyoti vā sarīranti vā, sarīranti vā kāyoti vā, kāyaṁ appiyaṁ karitvā esese ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāte, vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Theravādin:Do you maintain then that there are both results and enjoyer thereof?“atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno”, tena vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Yes.“añño kāyo añño puggalo”ti. Puggalavādin:Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Theravādin:Is there an enjoyer of that enjoyer?“vattabbe kho—Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .‘kāyoti vā sarīranti vā, sarīranti vā kāyoti vā, kāyaṁ appiyaṁ karitvā esese ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāte, vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Puggalavādin:atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’, no ca vattabbe—Puggalavādin:Yes.‘añño kāyo añño puggalo’”ti micchā.

Puggalavādin:No ce pana vattabbe—Theravādin:Then, if this and that be so, is there no making an end of ill, no … etc.complete in full similarly to:“añño kāyo añño puggalo”ti, no ca vata re vattabbe—complete in full similarly to:“kāyoti vā sarīranti vā, sarīranti vā kāyoti vā, kāyaṁ appiyaṁ karitvā esese ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāte, vuttaṁ bhagavatā—You are maintaining that there is both result and enjoyer thereof, is then result one thing, and the enjoyer of it another?‘atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’”ti. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said …complete as usual.Yaṁ tattha vadesi—Puggalavādin:“vattabbe kho—complete as usual.‘kāyoti vā sarīranti vā, sarīranti vā kāyoti vā, kāyaṁ appiyaṁ karitvā esese ekaṭṭhe same samabhāge tajjāte, vuttaṁ bhagavatā—Supernormal Poweratthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’, no ca vattabbe—Examination into “Soul” continued by reference to Superintellectual Power‘añño kāyo añño puggalo’”ti micchā. Puggalavādin:Is it wrong to say “the personor soulis known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?(Saṅkhittaṁ.)

Puggalavādin:Paññattānuyogo.

or soulGatianuyoga

Puggalavādin:Have there not been those who could transform themselves by magic potency?Puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Puggalavādin:If that be so, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say “the personor soulis known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”. Again, have there not been those who could hear sounds by the element of celestial hearing,… or know the mind of another, or remember previous lives,or see visible objects by the celestial eye, or realize the destruction of the “intoxicants”?So puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

or soulPuggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Puggalavādin:If these things be so, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”.Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Añño puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Theravādin:Granting that there have been those who could transform themselves by magic potency, is it for that reason that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Yes.Puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:When one has through magic potency transformed himself, was he then the personal entity, and not when not so transforming himself?So ca añño ca sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? This question is asked, and so answered, in the case of the other five modes of Superintellectual faculty named above.Āmantā. This question is asked, and so answered, in the case of the other five modes of Superintellectual faculty named above.Neva so sandhāvati, na añño sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Appeal to the SuttasNa hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?Puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Is there notone whom we callmother?So puggalo sandhāvati, añño puggalo sandhāvati, so ca añño ca sandhāvati, neva so sandhāvati na añño sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

one whom we callNa vattabbaṁ—Puggalavādin:If there be, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”. Again, is there notone whom we callfather, are there not brothers, sisters, nobles, brahmins, merchants, serfs, householders, religious,devas, humans?“puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokan”ti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. one whom we callNanu vuttaṁ bhagavatā—

Puggalavādin:If there be, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say “the person is known”, etc.“Sa sattakkhattuparamaṁ, Puggalavādin:sandhāvitvāna puggalo; Theravādin:Granting there are mothers, fathers, etc., is it for this reason that you insist thus respecting the personal entity?Dukkhassantakaro hoti, Puggalavādin:Yes.sabbasaṁyojanakkhayā”ti.

Puggalavādin:Attheva suttantoti? Theravādin:Is there anyone who, not having been a mother, becomes a mother?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Yes.Tena hi puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti.

Puggalavādin:Na vattabbaṁ—Theravādin:Is there anyone who, not having been a personal entity, becomes one?“puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokan”ti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Nanu vuttaṁ bhagavatā—This pair of questions is then put concerning“father”, “brother”…“deva”, “human”,and answered as above.“anamataggoyaṁ, bhikkhave, saṁsāro. This pair of questions is then put concerning“father”, “brother”…“deva”, “human”,and answered as above.Pubbakoṭi na paññāyati, avijjānīvaraṇānaṁ sattānaṁ taṇhāsaṁyojanānaṁ sandhāvataṁ saṁsaratan”ti. Theravādin:Granting the existence of a mother, is it for this reason that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?Attheva suttantoti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Tena hi puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti.

Theravādin:Is there anyone who, having been a mother, is no longer a mother?Puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Sveva puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Theravādin:Is there anyone who, having been a personal entity, is no longer one?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Sveva puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. This last pair of questions is then put with respect to“father”and the rest, and answered as above.Atthi koci manusso hutvā devo hotīti? This last pair of questions is then put with respect to“father”and the rest, and answered as above.Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?Sveva manusso so devoti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Is there no such thing as a “stream-winner” (or one who has entered the first stage of the way to salvation)?Sveva manusso so devoti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Puggalavādin:If there be such a thing, then indeed, good sir, it is right to assent to the original proposition. Again, is there no such thing as a “once-returner”, a “no-returner”, an arahant, one who is freed in both ways, one who isemancipated by understanding, one who has the testimony within himself, one who has arrived at right views, one who is emancipated by faith, one who marches along with wisdom, one who marches along with faith?Manusso hutvā devo hoti, devo hutvā manusso hoti, manussabhūto añño, devo añño, manussabhūto svevāyaṁ sandhāvatīti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Sace hi sandhāvati sveva puggalo ito cuto paraṁ lokaṁ anañño, hevaṁ maraṇaṁ na hehiti, pāṇātipātopi nupalabbhati. Puggalavādin:Then surely, good sir, it is right to affirm the first proposition.Kammaṁ atthi, kammavipāko atthi, katānaṁ kammānaṁ vipāko atthi, kusalākusale vipaccamāne svevāyaṁ sandhāvatīti micchā.

Puggalavādin:Sveva puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Theravādin:Granted that there is such a thing as a “stream-winner”, is it for that reason that the “person” is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Yes.Atthi koci manusso hutvā yakkho hoti, peto hoti, nerayiko hoti, tiracchānagato hoti, oṭṭho hoti, goṇo hoti, gadrabho hoti, sūkaro hoti, mahiṁso hotīti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Is there anyone who, not having been a stream-winner, is one now?Sveva manusso so mahiṁsoti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Sveva manusso so mahiṁsoti? Theravādin:Is there anyone who, not having been a “person”, is one now?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Manusso hutvā mahiṁso hoti, mahiṁso hutvā manusso hoti, manussabhūto añño, mahiṁso añño, manussabhūto svevāyaṁ sandhāvatīti micchā …pe….

Puggalavādin:Sace hi sandhāvati sveva puggalo ito cuto paraṁ lokaṁ anañño, hevaṁ maraṇaṁ na hehiti, pāṇātipātopi nupalabbhati. Theravādin:Again, granted that there is such an one as a stream-winner, and that this is the reason for your affirmation as to the personal entity, is there anyone who having been a stream-winner, is so no longer?Kammaṁ atthi, kammavipāko atthi, katānaṁ kammānaṁ vipāko atthi, kusalākusale vipaccamāne svevāyaṁ sandhāvatīti micchā.

Puggalavādin:Yes.Sveva puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Is there anyone who, not having been a person, is one now?Atthi koci khattiyo hutvā brāhmaṇo hotīti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Sveva khattiyo so brāhmaṇoti? These questions are now put regarding the other designations, and are answered similarly.Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

These questions are now put regarding the other designations, and are answered similarly.Atthi koci khattiyo hutvā vesso hoti, suddo hotīti? Puggalavādin:Ifas you sayit be wrong to assert “the person is known, etc., …” are there notthe accepted terms of“the Four Pairs of men”, “the Eight Individuals”?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Sveva khattiyo so suddoti? as you sayNa hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

the accepted terms ofAtthi koci brāhmaṇo hutvā vesso hoti, suddo hoti, khattiyo hotīti? Puggalavādin:But if that be so, surely it is right to speak of the “person” as known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Sveva brāhmaṇo so khattiyoti? Theravādin:Granting that there are the Four, the Eight, is itfor this reasonyou assert the first proposition?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Yes.Atthi koci vesso hutvā suddo hoti, khattiyo hoti, brāhmaṇo hotīti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Do the Four, the Eight, appear because of the Buddha's appearing?Sveva vesso so brāhmaṇoti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Atthi koci suddo hutvā khattiyo hoti, brāhmaṇo hoti, vesso hotīti? Theravādin:Does the “person” appear because of the Buddha's appearing?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Sveva suddo so vessoti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Yes.Sveva puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Then at the Buddha's finalNibbāna, is the “person” annihilated, so that no personal entity exists?Hatthacchinno hatthacchinnova hoti, pādacchinno pādacchinnova hoti, hatthapādacchinno hatthapādacchinnova hoti, kaṇṇacchinno … nāsacchinno … kaṇṇanāsacchinno … aṅgulicchinno … aḷacchinno … kaṇḍaracchinno … kuṇihatthako … phaṇahatthako … kuṭṭhiyo … gaṇḍiyo … kilāsiyo … sosiyo … apamāriyo … oṭṭho … goṇo … gadrabho … sūkaro … mahiṁso mahiṁsova hotīti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Na vattabbaṁ—Theravādin:The personyou sayis known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact—is the person conditioned?“sveva puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokan”ti? you sayĀmantā. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Nanu sotāpanno puggalo manussalokā cuto devalokaṁ upapanno tatthapi sotāpannova hotīti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā.

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Hañci sotāpanno puggalo manussalokā cuto devalokaṁ upapanno tatthapi sotāpannova hoti, tena vata re vattabbe—Puggalavādin:“sveva puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokan”ti.

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Sotāpanno puggalo manussalokā cuto devalokaṁ upapanno tatthapi sotāpannova hotīti katvā tena ca kāraṇena sveva puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Yes.Sotāpanno puggalo manussalokā cuto devalokaṁ upapanno tatthapi manusso hotīti katvā? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Theravādin:Apart from the conditioned or the unconditioned, is there another, a third alternative?Sveva puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Anañño avigato sandhāvatīti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Anañño avigato sandhāvatīti? Theravādin:But was it not said by the Exalted One:Āmantā. “There are,bhikkhus, these two irreducible categories—what are the two? The irreducible category of the conditioned, the irreducible category of the unconditioned. These are the two”?Hatthacchinno hatthacchinnova hoti, pādacchinno pādacchinnova hoti, hatthapādacchinno hatthapādacchinnova hoti, kaṇṇacchinno … nāsacchinno … kaṇṇanāsacchinno … aṅgulicchinno … aḷacchinno … kaṇḍaracchinno … kuṇihatthako … phaṇahatthako … kuṭṭhiyo … gaṇḍiyo … kilāsiyo … sosiyo … apamāriyo … oṭṭho … goṇo … gadrabho … sūkaro … mahiṁso mahiṁsova hotīti? Is the Suttanta thus?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Yes.Sveva puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Hence it is surely wrong to say that apart from the conditioned and the unconditioned, there is another, a third alternative.Sarūpo sandhāvatīti? Theravādin (continues):You say that the person is neither conditioned nor unconditioned? Are then the conditioned, the unconditioned, the person, entirely different things?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… continuessarūpo sandhāvatīti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said …Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Taṁ jīvaṁ taṁ sarīranti? Theravādin:Are the aggregates conditioned,Nibbānaunconditioned, the person neither conditioned nor unconditioned?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Yes.Savedano …pe… Puggalavādin:sasañño …pe… Theravādin:Then are the aggregates,Nibbāna, and the person, three entirely different things?sasaṅkhāro …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .saviññāṇo sandhāvatīti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… The last two questions are then applied to each aggregate taken separately: material qualities, feeling, perception, mental coefficients, consciousness).saviññāṇo sandhāvatīti? The last two questions are then applied to each aggregate taken separately: material qualities, feeling, perception, mental coefficients, consciousness).Āmantā. Theravādin:Is the genesis of the person apparent, and its passing away also, and is its duration distinctively apparent?Taṁ jīvaṁ taṁ sarīranti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Sveva puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Arūpo sandhāvatīti? Theravādin:It was said by the Exalted One:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… “Bhikkhus, there are these three characteristics of the conditioned: of conditioned things the genesis is apparent, the passing away is apparent, the duration amidst change is apparent”.arūpo sandhāvatīti? Hence if these three are characteristics of the person, this is alsoconditioned. Are these three characteristicsnotapparent in the person?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:No, they are not apparent.Aññaṁ jīvaṁ aññaṁ sarīranti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Avedano …pe… Puggalavādin:asañño …pe… Theravādin:It was said by the Exalted One:asaṅkhāro …pe… “Bhikkhus, there are these three characteristics of the unconditioned: of unconditioned things,bhikkhus, the genesis is not apparent, the passing away is not apparent, the duration amidst change is not apparent”.aviññāṇo sandhāvatīti? Now if all theseas you saydo not characterize thenotion of“person”, the person is unconditioned.Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… as you sayaviññāṇo sandhāvatīti? notion ofĀmantā. Theravādin:The person who has attained finalNibbāna, does he exist in the Goal, or does he not exist therein?Aññaṁ jīvaṁ aññaṁ sarīranti? Puggalavādin:He exists in the Goal.Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Sveva puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Theravādin:Is then the person who has finally attained eternal?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Rūpaṁ sandhāvatīti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… Theravādin:Is the person who has attained finalNibbānaand does not exist in the Goal annihilated?rūpaṁ sandhāvatīti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Taṁ jīvaṁ taṁ sarīranti? Theravādin:On what does the person depend in order to persist?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:He persists through dependence on coming-to-be.Vedanā …pe… Puggalavādin:saññā …pe… Theravādin:Isthe state ofcoming-to-be impermanent, conditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?saṅkhārā …pe… the state ofviññāṇaṁ sandhāvatīti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… Puggalavādin:viññāṇaṁ sandhāvatīti? Theravādin:Is the person also impermanent, conditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Taṁ jīvaṁ taṁ sarīranti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?Sveva puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṁ lokaṁ, parasmā lokā imaṁ lokanti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Is there no one who, on feeling pleasurable feeling, knows that he is feeling it?Rūpaṁ na sandhāvatīti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… Puggalavādin:Surely, if that be so, good sir, it is right to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”… and if he, on feeling painful feeling, knows that he is feeling it—you admit this?—it is right to say “the person is known”, etc. So also for neutral feeling.rūpaṁ na sandhāvatīti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:I note what you affirm. Now is itfor this reasonthat you maintain the person to be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?Aññaṁ jīvaṁ aññaṁ sarīranti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Vedanā …pe… Theravādin:Then is one who, on feeling pleasurable feeling, knows he is feeling it, a personal entity, and is one who, on that occasion, does not know,nota personal entity?saññā …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .saṅkhārā …pe… Puggalavādin:viññāṇaṁ na sandhāvatīti? Theravādin:You deny this also in the case of painful and neutral feeling?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… Puggalavādin:Yes, that cannot truly be said … .viññāṇaṁ na sandhāvatīti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:But you maintain,because of this self-awareness, that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?Aññaṁ jīvaṁ aññaṁ sarīranti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Na hevaṁ vattabbe. Puggalavādin:(Saṅkhittaṁ.)

Theravādin:Is then pleasurable feeling one thing and the self-conscious enjoyer another?Khandhesu bhijjamānesu, Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .so ce bhijjati puggalo; Puggalavādin:Ucchedā bhavati diṭṭhi, Same query and answer in the case of painful and neutral feelings.yā buddhena vivajjitā.

Same query and answer in the case of painful and neutral feelings.Khandhesu bhijjamānesu, Puggalavādin:You deny that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact: Is there then no one who may be occupied in contemplating theconcept ofbody with respect to his physical frame?no ce bhijjati puggalo; Puggalavādin:Puggalo sassato hoti, concept ofnibbānena samasamoti.

Puggalavādin:… or in contemplatingthe concept offeeling, or consciousness, or certain mental properties with respect to these in himself, respectively?Gatianuyogo.

Puggalavādin:Upādāpaññattānuyoga

the concept ofRūpaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Then surely, good sir, it is right to say as I do with respect to the person.Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Rūpaṁ aniccaṁ saṅkhataṁ paṭiccasamuppannaṁ khayadhammaṁ vayadhammaṁ virāgadhammaṁ nirodhadhammaṁ vipariṇāmadhammanti? Theravādin:Granting the carrying out by anyone of the four applications in mindfulness, is itfor this reasonthat you say as you do with respect to the personal entity?Āmantā? Puggalavādin:Yes.Puggalopi anicco saṅkhato paṭiccasamuppanno khayadhammo vayadhammo virāgadhammo nirodhadhammo vipariṇāmadhammoti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Theravādin:Then is anyone when so engaged a person, and not, when he is not so engaged?Vedanaṁ upādāya … saññaṁ upādāya … saṅkhāre upādāya … viññāṇaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Viññāṇaṁ aniccaṁ saṅkhataṁ paṭiccasamuppannaṁ khayadhammaṁ vayadhammaṁ virāgadhammaṁ nirodhadhammaṁ vipariṇāmadhammanti? Theravādin:Or again, grantingas above… is “body” one thing, the contemplator another? and so for “feeling”, etc.?Āmantā. as abovePuggalopi anicco saṅkhato paṭiccasamuppanno khayadhammo vayadhammo virāgadhammo nirodhadhammo vipariṇāmadhammoti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Rūpaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? Theravādin:Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Yes.Nīlaṁ rūpaṁ upādāya nīlakassa puggalassa paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… Theravādin:Was it not said by the Exalted One:pītaṁ rūpaṁ upādāya … lohitaṁ rūpaṁ upādāya … odātaṁ rūpaṁ upādāya … sanidassanaṁ rūpaṁ upādāya … anidassanaṁ rūpaṁ upādāya … sappaṭighaṁ rūpaṁ upādāya … appaṭighaṁ rūpaṁ upādāya appaṭighassa puggalassa paññattīti? “O Mogharājan! look upon the worldAs voidof soul, and ever heedful bide.Cutout the world's opinions as to soul.So shalt thou get past death; so an thou look,The king of death shall no more look on thee”?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

“O Mogharājan! look upon the worldAs voidof soul, and ever heedful bide.Vedanaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? of soul, and ever heedful bide.Āmantā. Cutout the world's opinions as to soul.So shalt thou get past death; so an thou look,The king of death shall no more look on thee”?Kusalaṁ vedanaṁ upādāya kusalassa puggalassa paññattīti? Is it thus in the Suttanta?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… Puggalavādin:Yes.kusalaṁ vedanaṁ upādāya kusalassa puggalassa paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Hence it is surely wrong to say that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.Kusalā vedanā saphalā savipākā iṭṭhaphalā kantaphalā manuññaphalā asecanakaphalā sukhudrayā sukhavipākāti? Theravādin:Is it the personor soulhere who “looks upon”?Āmantā. or soulKusalopi puggalo saphalo savipāko iṭṭhaphalo kantaphalo manuññaphalo asecanakaphalo sukhudrayo sukhavipākoti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Vedanaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? Theravādin:Does he contemplate with or without material qualities?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:With them.Akusalaṁ vedanaṁ upādāya akusalassa puggalassa paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… Theravādin:Is that soul the same as that body?akusalaṁ vedanaṁ upādāya akusalassa puggalassa paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Akusalā vedanā saphalā savipākā aniṭṭhaphalā akantaphalā amanuññaphalā secanakaphalā dukkhudrayā dukkhavipākāti? Theravādin:But if he contemplates without material qualities, is that soul quite different from that body?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Akusalopi puggalo saphalo savipāko aniṭṭhaphalo akantaphalo amanuññaphalo secanakaphalo dukkhudrayo dukkhavipākoti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Theravādin:I ask againis it thesoul orperson who contemplates?Vedanaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? I ask againĀmantā. soul orAbyākataṁ vedanaṁ upādāya abyākatassa puggalassa paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… Puggalavādin:abyākataṁ vedanaṁ upādāya abyākatassa puggalassa paññattīti? Theravādin:Does he contemplate when he has gone within, or does he contemplate from withoutthe organism?Āmantā. the organismAbyākatā vedanā aniccā saṅkhatā paṭiccasamuppannā khayadhammā vayadhammā virāgadhammā nirodhadhammā vipariṇāmadhammāti? Puggalavādin:He contemplates when he has gone within.Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Abyākatopi puggalo anicco saṅkhato paṭiccasamuppanno khayadhammo vayadhammo virāgadhammo nirodhadhammo vipariṇāmadhammoti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Saññaṁ upādāya … saṅkhāre upādāya … viññāṇaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? Theravādin:Supposing he contemplates from without, is the soul one thing, the body another?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Kusalaṁ viññāṇaṁ upādāya kusalassa puggalassa paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… Puggalavādin:Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?kusalaṁ viññāṇaṁ upādāya kusalassa puggalassa paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Was not the Exalted One a speaker of truth, a speaker in season, a speaker of facts, a speaker of words that are right, that are not wrong, that are not ambiguous?Kusalaṁ viññāṇaṁ saphalaṁ savipākaṁ iṭṭhaphalaṁ kantaphalaṁ manuññaphalaṁ asecanakaphalaṁ sukhudrayaṁ sukhavipākanti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Now it was said by the Exalted One:Kusalopi puggalo saphalo savipāko iṭṭhaphalo kantaphalo manuññaphalo asecanakaphalo sukhudrayo sukhavipākoti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

“There is the person who works for his own good …”Viññāṇaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? Is the Suttanta thus?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Hence surely the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.Akusalaṁ viññāṇaṁ upādāya akusalassa puggalassa paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… Puggalavādin:… again, it was said by the Exalted One:akusalaṁ viññāṇaṁ upādāya akusalassa puggalassa paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. “There is one person,bhikkhus, who, being reborn in this world, is born for the good, for the happiness of many, to show compassion on the world, for the advantage, the good, the happiness ofdevasand of men”.Akusalaṁ viññāṇaṁ saphalaṁ savipākaṁ aniṭṭhaphalaṁ akantaphalaṁ amanuññaphalaṁ secanakaphalaṁ dukkhudrayaṁ dukkhavipākanti? Is the Suttanta thus?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Hence surely the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.Akusalopi puggalo saphalo savipāko aniṭṭhaphalo akantaphalo amanuññaphalo secanakaphalo dukkhudrayo dukkhavipākoti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Theravādin:Granting this, and also the veracity, etc., of the Exalted One, it was said by the Exalted One:Viññāṇaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? “All things are without soul”.Āmantā. Is the Suttanta thus?Abyākataṁ viññāṇaṁ upādāya abyākatassa puggalassa paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… Puggalavādin:abyākataṁ viññāṇaṁ upādāya abyākatassa puggalassa paññattīti? Theravādin:Hence surely it is wrong to say the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.Āmantā. …again, it was said by the Exalted One:Abyākataṁ viññāṇaṁ aniccaṁ saṅkhataṁ paṭiccasamuppannaṁ khayadhammaṁ vayadhammaṁ virāgadhammaṁ nirodhadhammaṁ vipariṇāmadhammanti? “He does not doubt that misery arises, comes to pass, that misery ceases, passes away, nor is he perplexed thereat. And thereupon independent insight comes herein to him. Now this, Kaccāna, thus far is right views”.Āmantā. Is the Suttanta thus?Abyākatopi puggalo anicco saṅkhato paṭiccasamuppanno khayadhammo vayadhammo virāgadhammo nirodhadhammo vipariṇāmadhammoti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Cakkhuṁ upādāya “cakkhumā puggalo”ti vattabboti? Theravādin:Hence surely it is wrong to say “the person is known”, etc.Āmantā. Theravādin:… again, was it not said by Bhikkhunī Vajirā to Māra the evil One:Cakkhumhi niruddhe “cakkhumā puggalo niruddho”ti vattabboti? “`Being'? What dost thou fancy by that word?'Mong false opinions, Māra, art thou strayed.This a mere bundle of formations is.Therefrom no `being' mayest thou obtain.For e'en as, when the factors are arranged,The product by the name `chariot' is known,So doth our usage covenant to say:`A being', when the aggregates are there.'Tis simply Ill that riseth, simply IllThat doth persist, and then fadeth away.Nought beside Ill there is that comes to be;Nought else but Ill there is that fades away”?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… “`Being'? What dost thou fancy by that word?'Mong false opinions, Māra, art thou strayed.This a mere bundle of formations is.Therefrom no `being' mayest thou obtain.For e'en as, when the factors are arranged,The product by the name `chariot' is known,So doth our usage covenant to say:`A being', when the aggregates are there.sotaṁ upādāya … ghānaṁ upādāya … jivhaṁ upādāya … kāyaṁ upādāya … manaṁ upādāya “manavā puggalo”ti vattabboti? 'Tis simply Ill that riseth, simply IllThat doth persist, and then fadeth away.Nought beside Ill there is that comes to be;Nought else but Ill there is that fades away”?Āmantā. Is the Suttanta thus?Manamhi niruddhe “manavā puggalo niruddho”ti vattabboti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Micchādiṭṭhiṁ upādāya “micchādiṭṭhiyo puggalo”ti vattabboti? Theravādin:… again, did not the venerable Ānanda say to the Exalted One:Āmantā. “It is said, lord, `the world is void, the world is void'. Now in what way, lord, is it meant that the world is void”?Micchādiṭṭhiyā niruddhāya “micchādiṭṭhiyo puggalo niruddho”ti vattabboti? and did not the Exalted One reply:Na hevaṁ vattabbe. and did not the Exalted One reply:Micchāsaṅkappaṁ upādāya … micchāvācaṁ upādāya … micchākammantaṁ upādāya … micchāājīvaṁ upādāya … micchāvāyāmaṁ upādāya … micchāsatiṁ upādāya … micchāsamādhiṁ upādāya “micchāsamādhiyo puggalo”ti vattabboti? “Inasmuch, Ānanda, as it is void of soul and of what belongs to soul, therefore is the world called void. And wherein, Ānanda, is it void of soul and of what belongs to soul? The eye, Ānanda, is verily void of soul and of what belongs to soul, so is visible object and the sense and contact of sight. So are the other organs, and objects of the senses, and the other senses. So is the co-ordinating organ, cognizable objects, mental consciousness and contact. All are void of soul and of what belongs to soul. And whatever pleasurable, painful, or neutral feelingarises, in relation to the senses, and the sense-co-ordinating mind that too is void of soul and of what belongs to soul. It is for this, Ānanda, that the world is said to be void”?Āmantā. Is the Suttanta thus?Micchāsamādhimhi niruddhe “micchāsamādhiyo puggalo niruddho”ti vattabboti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Puggalavādin:Sammādiṭṭhiṁ upādāya “sammādiṭṭhiyo puggalo”ti vattabboti? Theravādin:… again, whereas you affirm that the person is known, etc … and we know the veracity, etc., of the Exalted One, it was said by the Exalted One:Āmantā. “Bhikkhus, if there were soul, should I have that which belongs to a soul? Or if there were that which belongs to soul, should I have a soul? In both cases ye would reply: `Yea, lord'. But both soul and that which belongs to soul being in very truth and for ever impossible to be known, then this that is a stage of opinion, namely: `thatis the world,thatis the soul, this I shall hereafter become, permanent, constant, eternal, unchangeable—so shall I abide even like unto the Eternal'—is not this,bhikkhus, absolutely and entirely a doctrine of fools?” “Whatever it be not, lord, it surely is, absolutely and entirely a doctrine of fools”.Sammādiṭṭhiyā niruddhāya “sammādiṭṭhiyo puggalo niruddho”ti vattabboti? Is the Suttanta thus?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… Puggalavādin:Yes.sammāsaṅkappaṁ upādāya … sammāvācaṁ upādāya … sammākammantaṁ upādāya … sammāājīvaṁ upādāya … sammāvāyāmaṁ upādāya … sammāsatiṁ upādāya … sammāsamādhiṁ upādāya “sammāsamādhiyo puggalo”ti vattabboti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:… again, it was said by the Exalted One:Sammāsamādhimhi niruddhe “sammāsamādhiyo puggalo niruddho”ti vattabboti? “There are these three teachers, Seniya, to be found in the world—who are the three? There is first, Seniya, that kind of teacher who declares that there is a real, persistent soul in the life that now is, and in that which is to come; then there is the kind of teacher, Seniya, who declares that there is a real, persistent soul in the life that now is, but not a soul in a future life; lastly, there is a certain teacher who does not declare that there is a soul either in the life that now is, nor in that which is to come. The first, Seniya, of these three is called an Eternalist, the second is called an Annihilationist; the third of these, he, Seniya, is called the teacher, who is Buddha supreme. These are the three teachers to be found in the world”.Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Isthe Suttanta thus?Rūpaṁ upādāya, vedanaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Yes.Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Dvinnaṁ khandhānaṁ upādāya dvinnaṁ puggalānaṁ paññattīti? Theravādin:… again, did the Exalted One speak of “a butter-jar”?Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… Puggalavādin:Yes.rūpaṁ upādāya, vedanaṁ upādāya, saññaṁ upādāya, saṅkhāre upādāya, viññāṇaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Is there anyone who can make a jar out of butter?Pañcannaṁ khandhānaṁ upādāya pañcannaṁ puggalānaṁ paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Puggalavādin:Cakkhāyatanaṁ upādāya, sotāyatanaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? Theravādin:… finally, did the Exalted One speak of an oil-jar, a honey-jar, a molasses-jar, a milk-pail, a water-pot, a cup, flask, bowl of water, a “meal provided in perpetuity”, a “constant supply of congey”?Āmantā. Puggalavādin:Yes.Dvinnaṁ āyatanānaṁ upādāya dvinnaṁ puggalānaṁ paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… Theravādin:Is there any supply of congey that is permanent, stable, eternal, not liable to change?cakkhāyatanaṁ upādāya, sotāyatanaṁ upādāya …pe… Puggalavādin:Nay, that cannot truly be said … .dhammāyatanaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? Puggalavādin:Āmantā. Theravādin:Hence it is surely wrong to say “the soul is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”.Dvādasannaṁ āyatanānaṁ upādāya dvādasannaṁ puggalānaṁ paññattīti? Shwe Zan AungNa hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

This SuttaCentral edition was prepared byManfred WierichandVen. Vimalaand proofread byJosephine Tobin. Some changes were introduced:Cakkhudhātuṁ upādāya, sotadhātuṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? Manfred WierichĀmantā. Ven. VimalaDvinnaṁ dhātūnaṁ upādāya dvinnaṁ puggalānaṁ paññattīti? Josephine TobinNa hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… Abbreviations, i.e., those of cited works and the participants in the controversies, were expanded.Cross-references were linked.Some typographic changes were introduced, among others, i.e.: the phonetic symbol “ŋ” was changed to the Pāli diacritical letter “ṃ”, “ô” to “o”, single quotes to double quotes, and “:—” to “:”.Letter-spacing with fixed spaces was replaced with bold font.The corrigenda were merged into the text. Some could not be resolved, though.cakkhudhātuṁ upādāya, sotadhātuṁ upādāya …pe… Abbreviations, i.e., those of cited works and the participants in the controversies, were expanded.dhammadhātuṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? Cross-references were linked.Āmantā. Some typographic changes were introduced, among others, i.e.: the phonetic symbol “ŋ” was changed to the Pāli diacritical letter “ṃ”, “ô” to “o”, single quotes to double quotes, and “:—” to “:”.Aṭṭhārasannaṁ dhātūnaṁ upādāya aṭṭhārasannaṁ puggalānaṁ paññattīti? Letter-spacing with fixed spaces was replaced with bold font.Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

The corrigenda were merged into the text. Some could not be resolved, though.Cakkhundriyaṁ upādāya, sotindriyaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? This electronic version is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial 3.0 licence (CC BY-NC 3.0) as found here:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/Āmantā. All copyright is owned by the Pali Text Society. See also the statement under http://www.palitext.com/ → Publications → Copyright Announcement. For non-commercial use only.Dvinnaṁ indriyānaṁ upādāya dvinnaṁ puggalānaṁ paññattīti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… cakkhundriyaṁ upādāya, sotindriyaṁ upādāya …pe… aññātāvindriyaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? Āmantā. Bāvīsatīnaṁ indriyānaṁ upādāya bāvīsatīnaṁ puggalānaṁ paññattīti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Ekavokārabhavaṁ upādāya ekassa puggalassa paññattīti? Āmantā. Catuvokārabhavaṁ upādāya catunnaṁ puggalānaṁ paññattīti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… ekavokārabhavaṁ upādāya ekassa puggalassa paññattīti? Āmantā. Pañcavokārabhavaṁ upādāya pañcannaṁ puggalānaṁ paññattīti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… ekavokārabhave ekova puggaloti? Āmantā. Catuvokārabhave cattārova puggalāti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… ekavokārabhave ekova puggaloti? Āmantā. Pañcavokārabhave pañceva puggalāti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Yathā rukkhaṁ upādāya chāyāya paññatti, evamevaṁ rūpaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? (…) Yathā rukkhaṁ upādāya chāyāya paññatti, rukkhopi anicco chāyāpi aniccā, evamevaṁ rūpaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññatti, rūpampi aniccaṁ puggalopi aniccoti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… yathā rukkhaṁ upādāya chāyāya paññatti, añño rukkho aññā chāyā, evamevaṁ rūpaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññatti, aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggaloti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Yathā gāmaṁ upādāya gāmikassa paññatti, evamevaṁ rūpaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? Yathā gāmaṁ upādāya gāmikassa paññatti, añño gāmo añño gāmiko, evamevaṁ rūpaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññatti, aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggaloti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Yathā raṭṭhaṁ upādāya rañño paññatti, evamevaṁ rūpaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññattīti? Yathā raṭṭhaṁ upādāya rañño paññatti, aññaṁ raṭṭhaṁ añño rājā, evamevaṁ rūpaṁ upādāya puggalassa paññatti, aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño puggaloti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Yathā na nigaḷo negaḷiko, yassa nigaḷo so negaḷiko, evamevaṁ na rūpaṁ rūpavā, yassa rūpaṁ so rūpavāti? Yathā na nigaḷo negaḷiko, yassa nigaḷo so negaḷiko, añño nigaḷo añño negaḷiko, evamevaṁ na rūpaṁ rūpavā, yassa rūpaṁ so rūpavā, aññaṁ rūpaṁ añño rūpavāti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Citte citte puggalassa paññattīti? Āmantā. Citte citte puggalo jāyati jīyati mīyati cavati upapajjatīti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe… dutiye citte uppanne na vattabbaṁ soti vā aññoti vāti? Āmantā. Dutiye citte uppanne na vattabbaṁ kumārakoti vā kumārikāti vāti? Vattabbaṁ.

Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Hañci dutiye citte uppanne na vattabbaṁ—“soti vā aññoti vā”, tena vata re vattabbe—“dutiye citte uppanne na vattabbaṁ—‘kumārakoti vā kumārikāti vā’”ti. Yaṁ tattha vadesi—“vattabbe kho—‘dutiye citte uppanne na vattabbaṁ—soti vā aññoti vā, dutiye citte uppanne vattabbaṁ—kumārakoti vā kumārikāti vā’”ti micchā.

Hañci vā pana dutiye citte uppanne vattabbaṁ—“kumārakoti vā kumārikā”ti vā, tena vata re vattabbe—“dutiye citte uppanne vattabbaṁ—‘soti vā aññoti vā’”ti. Yaṁ tattha vadesi—“vattabbe kho—‘dutiye citte uppanne na vattabbaṁ—soti vā aññoti vā, dutiye citte uppanne vattabbaṁ—kumārakoti vā kumārikāti vā’”ti micchā.

Dutiye citte uppanne na vattabbaṁ—“soti vā aññoti vā”ti? Āmantā. Dutiye citte uppanne na vattabbaṁ—“itthīti vā purisoti vā gahaṭṭhoti vā pabbajitoti vā devoti vā manussoti vā”ti? Vattabbaṁ.

Ājānāhi niggahaṁ. Hañci dutiye citte uppanne na vattabbaṁ—“soti vā aññoti vā”, tena vata re vattabbe—“dutiye citte uppanne na vattabbaṁ—‘devoti vā manussoti vā’”ti. Yaṁ tattha vadesi—“vattabbe kho—‘dutiye citte uppanne na vattabbaṁ—soti vā aññoti vā, dutiye citte uppanne vattabbaṁ—devoti vā manussoti vā’”ti micchā.

Hañci vā pana dutiye citte uppanne vattabbaṁ—“devoti vā manussoti vā”, tena vata re vattabbe—“dutiye citte uppanne vattabbaṁ—‘soti vā aññoti vā’”ti. Yaṁ tattha vadesi—“vattabbe kho—‘dutiye citte uppanne na vattabbaṁ—soti vā aññoti vā, dutiye citte uppanne vattabbaṁ—devoti vā manussoti vā’”ti micchā …pe….

Na vattabbaṁ—“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti? Āmantā. Nanu yo passati yaṁ passati yena passati, so passati taṁ passati tena passatīti? Āmantā. Hañci yo passati yaṁ passati yena passati, so passati taṁ passati tena passati; tena vata re vattabbe—“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti.

Na vattabbaṁ—“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti? Āmantā. Nanu yo suṇāti …pe… yo ghāyati … yo sāyati … yo phusati … yo vijānāti yaṁ vijānāti yena vijānāti, so vijānāti taṁ vijānāti tena vijānātīti? Āmantā. Hañci yo vijānāti yaṁ vijānāti yena vijānāti, so vijānāti taṁ vijānāti tena vijānāti; tena vata re vattabbe—“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti.

Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Āmantā. Nanu yo na passati yaṁ na passati yena na passati, so na passati taṁ na passati tena na passatīti? Āmantā. Hañci yo na passati yaṁ na passati yena na passati, so na passati taṁ na passati tena na passati; no ca vata re vattabbe—“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti.

Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Āmantā. Nanu yo na suṇāti …pe… yo na ghāyati … yo na sāyati … yo na phusati … yo na vijānāti yaṁ na vijānāti yena na vijānāti, so na vijānāti taṁ na vijānāti tena na vijānātīti? Āmantā. Hañci yo na vijānāti yaṁ na vijānāti yena na vijānāti, so na vijānāti taṁ na vijānāti tena na vijānāti; no ca vata re vattabbe—“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti.

Na vattabbaṁ—“puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā”ti? Āmantā. Nanu vuttaṁ bhagavatā—“passāmahaṁ, bhikkhave, dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkantamānusakena satte cavamāne upapajjamāne hīne paṇīte suvaṇṇe dubbaṇṇe, sugate duggate yathākammūpage satte pajānāmī”ti. Attheva suttantoti? Āmantā. Tena hi puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti.

Vuttaṁ bhagavatā—“passāmahaṁ, bhikkhave, dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkantamānusakena satte cavamāne upapajjamāne hīne paṇīte suvaṇṇe dubbaṇṇe, sugate duggate yathākammūpage satte pajānāmī”ti katvā teneva kāraṇena puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti? Āmantā. Bhagavā dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkantamānusakena rūpaṁ passati puggalaṁ passatīti? Rūpaṁ passati. Rūpaṁ puggalo, rūpaṁ cavati, rūpaṁ upapajjati, rūpaṁ yathākammūpaganti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Bhagavā dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkantamānusakena rūpaṁ passati puggalaṁ passatīti? Puggalaṁ passati. Puggalo rūpaṁ rūpāyatanaṁ rūpadhātu nīlaṁ pītakaṁ lohitakaṁ odātaṁ cakkhuviññeyyaṁ cakkhusmiṁ paṭihaññati, cakkhussa āpāthaṁ āgacchatīti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Bhagavā dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkantamānusakena rūpaṁ passati puggalaṁ passatīti? Ubho passati. Ubho rūpaṁ rūpāyatanaṁ rūpadhātu, ubho nīlā, ubho pītakā, ubho lohitakā, ubho odātā, ubho cakkhuviññeyyā, ubho cakkhusmiṁ paṭihaññanti, ubho cakkhussa āpāthaṁ āgacchanti, ubho cavanti, ubho upapajjanti, ubho yathākammūpagāti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe.

Upādāpaññattānuyogo.

Purisakārānuyoga

Kalyāṇapāpakāni kammāni upalabbhantīti? Āmantā. Kalyāṇapāpakānaṁ kammānaṁ kattā kāretā upalabbhatīti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Kalyāṇapāpakāni kammāni upalabbhantīti, kalyāṇapāpakānaṁ kammānaṁ kattā kāretā upalabbhatīti? Āmantā. Tassa kattā kāretā upalabbhatīti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Tassa kattā kāretā upalabbhatīti? Āmantā. Tassa tasseva natthi dukkhassa antakiriyā, natthi vaṭṭupacchedo, natthi anupādāparinibbānanti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Kalyāṇapāpakāni kammāni upalabbhantīti, kalyāṇapāpakānaṁ kammānaṁ kattā kāretā upalabbhatīti? Āmantā. Puggalo upalabbhatīti, puggalassa kattā kāretā upalabbhatīti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….

Kalyāṇapāpakāni kammāni upalabbhantīti, kalyāṇapāpakānaṁ kammānaṁ kattā kāretā upalabbhatīti? Āmantā. Nibbānaṁ upalabbhatīti, nibbānassa kattā kāretā upalabbhatīti? Na hevaṁ vattabbe …pe….